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Abstract 
 
The relationship between language and thought has long been a topic of interest and 
controversy in cognitive science. In this dissertation, I address one aspect of this issue: 
when is language present during internal thought? Simple introspection tells us that we 
sometimes use inner speech, but is this the exception or the rule? Using eye-tracking 
measures, we investigated whether infants, children and adults implicitly activate verbal 
labels while silently looking at pictures of objects. In the first study, 4-year-olds, 7-year-
olds and adults completed a working memory task. While the two older age groups 
spontaneously chose a verbal encoding strategy for the pictoral stimuli, the 4-year-olds did 
not, suggesting a late emergence for implicit language use. The second study, however, 
challenges this conclusion as we find evidence for spontaneous implicit verbal activation in 
24-month-old infants during free-viewing of pictures of familiar objects. The final study 
provides a more detailed look at the nature of the implicit verbal representations that are 
activated in adults during visual image processing. Unlike the 24-month-old infants, and 
unlike adults engaged in a working memory task, adults in this visual image processing 
task did not robustly activate phonological representations but did show some evidence of 
lexical activation, perhaps at a more abstract level of representation. Taken together, these 
results suggest that: 1) even very young children spontaneously engage inner speech, 2) 
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adults and children use implicit verbal labeling in different ways, and 3) different tasks can 
evoke different levels of implicit verbal activation.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
What is language for? The most obvious use, of course, is communication. However, 
it also clear that we often use language even in the absence of communication. We silently 
argue the pros and cons of different alternatives before making a decision. We repeat a 
phone number to ourselves for the duration of the short walk from the phonebook, or 
computer monitor, to the phone. We ask everyone else in the room to be quiet  so that we 
can think through the numbers involved in a calculation. What is the role of language in 
these situations? Is it epiphenomenal or does it serve a cognitive function? What 
determines when we do and when we do not call up linguistic representations in our 
private thoughts? 
Understanding the parameters of inner speech – when does it emerge in 
development which task contexts elicit it, and what is the nature of the representations 
involved? – is critical to a range of theories concerning the relationship between language 
and thought. Many scholars have written about the relationship between language and 
thought, often arriving at the conclusion that the most important functions of language are 
in fact separate from communication. In discussing the evolution of language, Chomsky 
(2007) suggests that in fact the cognitive architecture of language evolved for thought 
rather than communication. Berwick, Friederici, Chomsky and Bolhuis (2013) expand on 
this position: “One key implication is that communication, an element of externalization, is 
an ancillary aspect of language, not its key function, as maintained by what is perhaps a 
majority of scholars. Rather, language serves primarily as an internal ‘instrument of 
thought’” (p. 90). Studying the nature of inner speech is of direct relevance to such 
hypotheses. To the extent that language is an instrument of thought, and not simply a tool 
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for communication, we should observe the activation of linguistic representations in non-
communicative contexts. 
Setting aside the question of the primary function of language, the study of inner 
speech bears on how language interacts with nonverbal cognition. Whorf’s (1956) 
linguistic relativity hypothesis proposes that the language one speaks has deep 
consequences for the thoughts one can think. Investigating the extent to which thought 
spontaneously involves linguistic representations provides a different angle for examining 
this hypothesis. Perhaps language does not change what thoughts you can think, but rather 
language is often the medium for the thoughts you do think. If the latter is true, then we 
might see speakers of different languages performing non-communicative cognitive tasks 
differently, but this would reflect the verbal representations that they are using to perform 
the tasks, and would not indicate underlying divergences in their conceptual 
representations. 
The relationship between language and thought is also central in Spelke’s (2003) 
theory of combinatorial thought, in which she discusses uniquely human cognitive 
capacities. Spelke suggests that language provides a powerful combinatorial tool for 
cognition. In particular, she proposes that it is natural language that allows humans, and 
not other primates, to combine information across the otherwise modular components of 
core cognition.  Finding widespread implicit verbal activation in non-communicative 
contexts would add credence to the hypothesis that concepts are combined using linguistic 
representations, since it would demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is active during 
cognitive processing. 
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 Vygotsky (1934/1987), discussed self-directed speech from a developmental 
perspective, and drew a distinction between audible private speech and silent inner 
speech. He proposed that language begins as an external social tool, which is gradually co-
opted as a cognitive tool. As part of this process, children go through an intermediate stage 
of overt private speech in their preschool years. Private speech becomes internalized in the 
early elementary school years, and continues to become more abstract and dissimilar from 
overt speech over development. In contrast to the theories discussed above, which discuss 
cognitive functions as central to language, Vygotsky’s approach suggests a relatively late 
emergence for language-in-thought. Non-communicative functions are even further 
removed from the development of language in Piaget’s The Language and Thought of the 
Child (1923/1962), in which preschoolers’ private speech is described as social speech that 
is poorly executed due to egocentrism, and so it is not as conceived of as a cognitive tool. 
On Piaget’s view, language development is initially closely tied to cognitive development, as 
both rely on symbolic representations, but language is not actually involved in internal 
thought. 
Across the varied perspectives outlined above, there is the common question of the 
relationship between language and private thought. The goal of this dissertation is to 
explore this relationship by asking: When is language present in silent thought? From 
infancy to adulthood, is thinking in words the exception or the rule? What levels of 
representation are accessed in inner speech - is inner speech always phonological in nature 
or can it exist at higher levels of linguistic representation? 
Current theories and empirical findings on inner speech in adults do not paint a 
clear picture (for review, see Martinez-Manrique & Vicente, 2010; Vicente & Martinez-
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Manrique, 2011). Estimates of the average occurrence of inner speech, based on self-
reports obtained from experience-sampling, range from approximately 25% of the time 
(Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) to 75% (Klinger & Cox, 1987). Descriptions of the 
phenomenology of inner speech are also inconsistent. Vygotsky (1934/1987) suggests that, 
in the adult state, inner speech is a syntactically simplified form of outer speech that is also 
degraded in other ways, such as pitch. Martinez-Manrique and Vicente (2010) point out 
that inner speech can often occur in sophisticated full sentences, although this is most 
apparent when mentally rehearsing for future external speech or writing. Fernyhough 
(2004) reconciles the existence of both impoverished and elaborate inner speech by 
suggesting that these phenomena occur at different levels of processing. In contrast, in 
discussing the role of language in consciousness, Jackendoff (1996) specifically targets 
phonology as the level of representation involved in conscious inner speech. To gain 
traction on any of these approaches, it is clear that more empirical evidence is needed on 
the presence and form of internal verbal representations in different contexts. 
Research that addresses the development of internal verbalization also does not 
yield a consistent picture. Much of this work explores Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) proposal 
that speech is initially solely a social tool and gradually becomes internalized. Studies have 
documented that audible self-directed speech begins around 2-years of age and becomes 
more covert through the preschool and early elementary school years. This trajectory is 
taken as evidence for the emergence of inner speech (Berk, 1986; Fernyhough, 2009; 
Winsler & Naglieri, 2003; see Winsler, 2009 for review). However, there is little direct 
evidence for the presence or absence of inner speech during these years (but see Al-
Namlah, Fernyhough, & Meins, 2006). 
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Another line of work that speaks to the development of internal verbal 
representations comes from the working memory literature. While adults routinely make 
use of verbal representations, such as in the phonological loop (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), to 
maintain information in working memory, such strategies are not observed in young 
children. Preschoolers do not to show effects of word length, phonological similarity or 
verbal suppression when memorizing images, suggesting that they do not use internal 
verbalization in these tasks (Conrad, 1971; Ford & Silber, 1994; Hayes & Schulze, 1977; 
Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Hitch, Halliday, Dodd, & Littler, 1989; but see Henry, Tuner, Smith, 
& Leather, 2000; Hulme, Silvester, Smith, & Muir, 1986). However, it is possible that young 
children do activate internal verbal representations in these tasks during encoding, but do 
not use verbal rehearsal, so there is no trace of the verbal representation remaining at test 
(Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Johnston & Conning, 1990: Nairne, 1990). 
While studies on the development of working memory tend to argue against implicit 
verbal activation in young children, recent results from infant lexical development studies 
suggest that implicit verbalization might in fact be present very early in childhood. In a 
series of priming studies, 18- and 24-month-old infants saw a prime image, presented in 
silence, followed by a split screen of the target and the distractor images, at which point 
they heard the target label (Mani, & Plunkett, 2010; 2011; Mani, Durrant, & Floccia, 2012). 
Infants’ looking behavior is affected by the phonological relationship between the labels for 
the target and prime images, even though the prime image is never explicitly labeled, 
indicating that the infants spontaneously activated phonological representations for the 
images in these studies. Thus, these studies suggest that visually presenting images of 
objects leads to phonological activation of the object labels in 18 and 24 month old infants, 
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at least in a semi-verbal context. It is an open question whether implicit labeling is a 
spontaneous reaction to visual object encoding at this age, or if this process is elicited by 
the fact that other images are explicitly labeled in these studies, perhaps creating a “naming 
game” task context. 
 The current studies focus on the phenomenon of implicit verbal labeling of images 
as a window into the development of inner speech. There are several reasons for taking 
this approach. Targeting lexical activation is an attractive starting point for investigating 
internal linguistic representations. Gaining an understanding of implicit lexical activation 
will provide a solid foundation for future work examining more complex linguistic 
structures in which these lexical items are combined. Using single-word activation, with 
concrete nouns in particular, has the additional advantage of allowing comparisons across 
age groups. We can look for implicit verbal labeling even in infants, who are not yet 
producing complex linguistic structures, and use similar paradigms to probe these 
representations in adults. 
There are also other methodological reasons for focusing on implicit verbal labeling. 
It is more apparent how to evoke and measure concrete noun activation compared to more 
complex inner speech. In order to measure inner speech, we need a paradigm where we 
can reasonably predict what linguistic representations would be produced if inner speech 
is occurring. While it is straightforward to find images that reliably elicit one particular 
label, such as “apple”, it is more difficult to find stimuli that reliably elicit one particular 
sentence. 
The following chapters present three studies that explore implicit verbalization in 
different age groups, first in a visual working memory task and then in a less constrained 
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visual object processing task. In addition to the specific knowledge gained through this 
research, the studies presented here provide examples for how to probe the 
representations involved in inner speech without relying on introspection and self-report. 
Chapter 2 investigates the development of internal language use by measuring 
looking times to objects during encoding in a short-term visual memory task, based on 
prior work with adults (Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). We recorded eye movements while 
participants from different age groups encoded displays consisting of two images with 
short names and two images with long names. Longer looking times to the pictures of 
objects with longer names, as opposed to short names, would indicate that verbal label 
retrieval has occurred. Using this paradigm, we explore the development of verbal 
encoding of visual stimuli, comparing 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds and adults. 
Chapter 3 shifts the focus to a younger age group. Curiously, given the repeated 
failure to find implicit verbal activation in preschoolers in the working memory literature, 
the lexical priming studies conducted by Mani and colleagues indicate that verbal encoding 
does occur in infants (Mani, et al., 2012; Mani & Plunkett, 2010; 2011). These studies seem 
to suggest that infants engage in implicit verbal encoding in non-communicative contexts. 
However, they differ from implicit verbal encoding studies with adults in that some parts of 
the task involve explicit verbal labeling. In these studies, there is an alternating pattern 
between images that are silently presented and explicitly labeled images; the infants 
implicitly label the former. This verbal scaffolding might induce verbal encoding in infants, 
so we cannot conclude that this is something infants spontaneously engage in. We present a 
study that explores whether implicit verbal activation in infants is an artifact of this naming 
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game context, or if it is in fact spontaneous, by adapting the earlier paradigms to be 
completely nonverbal. 
Chapter 4 explores implicit verbal activation in adults in a picture viewing task that 
parallels the one used in the infant studies. The existing literature suggests that 
phonological activation occurs in infants during picture viewing but studies to date are 
much more equivocal with respect to implicit labeling in adults (e.g. Meyer, Belke, 
Humphreys, & Telling, 2007; Telling, 2008; Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). One source of 
ambiguity in evaluating the differences between adults and infants, and in reconciling 
divergent results from various adult studies, is that these studies use a variety of different 
paradigms. Here we discuss two experiments that use a paradigm based on the one used 
with infants in Chapter 3. We included a range of different types of stimuli in this priming 
paradigm in order to both investigate whether implicit verbal activation occurs and also 
learn more about the nature of these implicit representations. Specifically, we looked at 
both homophone priming and phonological-onset priming and found different results for 
these two types of trials. The data pattern suggests that implicit lexical activation might 
occur in the absence of phonological activation. 
Chapter 5 summarizes and synthesizes the results from Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and 
discusses different possible developmental trajectories. The question of whether implicit 
verbal encoding becomes more or less prevalent with age does not have a simple answer. 
Rather, the developmental theory must take into account the task context and how this 
might interact with age. The distinction between automatic and strategic verbal encoding is 
also critical in understanding the trajectory of this type of inner speech. Finally, it is also 
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important to consider that different levels of representation might be recruited for implicit 
labeling in different contexts.  
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Chapter 2. Spontaneous retrieval of object names in a short term 
memory task: Changes over development1 
 
The most obvious uses of language occur when information is being communicated. 
However, this is not the only function that language can serve. This observation has been 
made by a wide range of theorists (for example, Chomsky, 1979) and can be confirmed by 
the layperson’s introspective experiences. Whether it is in the conscious experience of 
thought as a silent speech stream or in the use of a rehearsal loop to bolster short term 
memory, we often recruit linguistic representations for non-communicative tasks. The 
perceived ubiquity of internal speech might suggest that the use of language in non-
linguistic tasks is an inherent property of linguistic competence. If this is the case, we might 
expect to see evidence of widespread non-communicative language use from the earliest 
moments that an individual acquires fluent language skills. This paper explores this issue 
by contrasting 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds and adults on one test of non-communicative 
language use. Specifically, we looked at the propensity to spontaneously activate the 
phonological representation of object names in a visual memory task. 
Young children do not report experiencing inner speech when asked about their 
mental processes during non-linguistic tasks (Flavell, Green, Flavell & Grossman, 1997; 
Flavell & Wong, 2009; Manfra, 2009). However, this could easily reflect a shortfall of 
introspection, rather than the absence of internal verbal representations. Thus, it is 
necessary to explore other approaches to the study of implicit language use. Since working 
memory in adults relies on phonological representations, even when the stimuli are visual, 
                                                          
1
 The studies described in this dissertation were all conducted in collaboration with Jesse Snedeker. 
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(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), this domain is an attractive one for investigating the 
development of inner speech as a cognitive tool.  
Studies on the development of working memory for visual stimuli have repeatedly 
failed to find evidence for verbal memory strategies in preschool aged children. 
Phonological similarity between items in a memory set does not impede working memory 
until children are school aged (Conrad, 1971; Hulme, 1984; Ford, & Silber, 1994), but visual 
similarity has an effect from an early age (Brown, 1977; Hayes & Schulze, 1977). In a 
paired-associate memory paradigm, Cramer (1975) found evidence of implicit labeling of 
pictoral stimuli in fourth and sixth grade children but not second graders. For example, the 
older children were more likely to show false recognition of a penny when pen and knee 
were paired in the memory set. These findings suggest that the younger children were not 
responding based on a verbal code. Similarly, sensitivity to word length and articulatory 
suppression in short term memory for pictures does not appear to emerge until seven or 
eight years of age, again indicating that younger children do not rely on verbal memory 
representations for visual stimuli (Allik & Seigal, 1976; Ford & Silber, 1994; Hitch & 
Halliday, 1983; Hitch, Halliday, Dodd, & Littler, 1989; but see Henry, Turner, Smith, & 
Leather, 2000; Hulme, Silvester, Smith, & Muir, 1986). 
However, these results are not conclusive with respect to verbal encoding. Memory 
tasks with a delay present two opportunities for phonological effects to arise: 1) at 
encoding, participants may or may not retrieve labels for images; 2) during the delay, 
participants may or may not engage in verbal rehearsal (Locke & Fehr, 1970; Morrison & 
Haith, 1976). There is ample evidence that preschool aged children do not reliably use 
verbal rehearsal (Flavell, Beach & Chinksy, 1966; Gathercole, Adams, & Hitch, 1994; 
12 
 
Ornstein, Naus, & Liberty, 1975; but see Henry, 1991). When young children are explicitly 
instructed to rehearse memory items, both phonological similarity and word length effects 
do emerge, suggesting that their absence in other studies might be due to a lack of 
rehearsal (Johnston & Conning, 1990; Johnston, Johnson, & Gray, 1987). Thus, it is possible 
that children of all ages activate verbal codes for the to-be-remembered material, but only 
the older children strategically employ rehearsal, and it is the lack of rehearsal that 
accounts for the absence of effects of phonological similarity, word length and articulatory 
suppression in younger age groups. Some support for this perspective comes from the 
finding that 5-year-olds make silent lip movements, perhaps reflecting verbal encoding,  
during stimulus presentation but not during the retention interval (Locke & Fehr, 1970; but 
see Flavell, Beach & Chinsky, 1966). On the other hand, the observation that verbal 
rehearsal generally emerges later for pictoral stimuli than verbal stimuli (e.g. Hitch, 
Halliday, Dodd, & Littler, 1989; Hitch, Woodin, & Baker, 1989; Hulme & Tordoff, 1989; 
Johnston, Johnson, & Gray, 1987; but see Henry, Turner, Smith, & Leather, 2000) does 
suggest that young children are less likely to verbally encode visual material. However, this 
evidence is indirect and open to other explanations, such as verbal material triggering a 
rehearsal strategy (Macleod, & Posner, 1984). To address these issues, it is important to 
observe encoding directly, rather than drawing inferences from recall or recognition 
performance. 
Several different lines of work have examined verbal encoding during visual tasks in 
adults. Meyer and colleagues (2007) found evidence for object label retrieval during a 
visual search task by measuring eye movement patterns as participants looked for the 
target image. Distractors that depicted objects that were homophonous with the label of 
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the target image attracted more looks than unrelated distractors, even though the task 
itself did not involve the object labels. Further evidence for verbal encoding comes from a 
study by Noizet and Pynte (1976) in which participants were instructed to silently look at 
images until they identified the depicted objects. Participants spent longer looking at 
objects with longer (multisyllabic) labels than those with shorter (monosyllabic) labels, 
indicating that they might be retrieving the verbal labels, even though they completed the 
study in silence. This finding, however, is open to alternate explanations: name length 
could potentially be confounded with visual or conceptual complexity, or participants 
might have interpreted the instruction to identify the images as an instruction to silently 
label them. Zelinsky and Murphy (2000) addressed these issues in a short-term visual 
memory task that also used a name length effect as a window into verbal encoding. In this 
study, participants were shown displays of four images to remember, followed by a 2.5 
second pause, and then a probe image that they identified as old or new. The four to-be-
remembered images consisted of two monosyllabic items and two multisyllabic items. 
They controlled for differences in conceptual and visual complexity by equating the stimuli 
based on categorization speed in a norming task. Zelinsky and Murphy found that adults 
spent longer looking at the multisyllabic items, indicating that they were activating verbal 
labels for the images during encoding. A second experiment with novel image-label pairs 
confirmed this finding. 
The current study adapts the short-term visual memory paradigm from Zelinsky 
and Murphy (2000) to look at the development of verbal encoding in a visual memory task. 
Critically, unlike many of the previous developmental studies, our approach looks at verbal 
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label activation during encoding, rather than testing for verbalization effects at retrieval, at 
which point a failure to rehearse could mask the effects of verbal encoding. 
We tested three age groups of participants in the current study: 4-year-olds, 7-year-
olds and adults. These age groups were chosen for the following reasons. Four-year-old 
children typically do not show phonological rehearsal effects in the short-term memory 
literature. Seven-year-old children are on the cusp of showing such effects (e.g. Bach & 
Underwood, 1970; Ford & Silber, 1994; but see Cramer, 1975) and generally demonstrate 
more use of metacognitive strategies, perhaps due to experience with formal education 
(Miller, 1993). Finally, testing adults allows us to replicate the name-length effects from 
Zelinsky and Murphy (2000) and provides a baseline for evaluating the results from the 
younger age groups. In Experiment 1, we validate the paradigm as a test of verbal encoding 
in each of the age groups. Experiment 2 then uses this paradigm to investigate spontaneous 
verbal encoding across these age groups. 
Experiment 1 
These studies employ a recognition memory paradigm based on Zelinsky and 
Murphy (2000). Before using this task with 4- and 7-year-olds, we needed to make sure 
that eye movements during the encoding phase are sensitive to verbal labeling in these age 
groups. In Experiment 1, participants named the images shown on the screen out loud, 
while encoding them for the memory task. Looking longer to images with longer labels in 
Experiment 1 confirms the sensitivity of the paradigm to labeling and allows us to interpret 
the presence or absence of implicit labeling in Experiment 2, which omits the labeling 
instruction. 
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Method 
Participants 
Our participants consisted of 15 4-year-old children (4;3 to 4;11 years, M=4;8 years, 
ten females), 15 7-year-olds (7;1 to 8;0 years, M=7;6 years, five females), and  15 adults (18 
to 50 years, M=28,  seven females). Children were recruited from a database of familes who 
had expressed interest in participating in research. The adults were drawn from the 
Harvard University participant pool, which includes students and members of the 
community. Five additional 4-year-olds participated in this study but were excluded from 
these analyses, one due to poor accuracy on the memory task, and four due to extensive eye 
tracking data loss. For both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, all participants were native 
English speakers. Also, in both experiments, children were given a small toy as a prize for 
participation and adults were compensated with partial course credit or a payment of $5.  
Materials  
Twenty colored line drawings were selected:  19 from the Rossion and Pourtois 
(2004) image set and one stylistically similar picture from an internet image search. Half 
the images had monosyllabic labels and the other half had three- or four-syllable labels 
compiled (see Appendix A for a complete item list). Since name length can correlate with 
visual complexity (Kelly, Springer, & Keil, 1990), we conducted a visual-categorization 
speed norming task.. In this procedure, taken from Murphy and Brownell (1985) and 
Zelinsky and Murphy (2000), participants saw a printed word on-screen immediately 
followed by an image, at which point they made a speeded judgment about whether the 
picture matched the word. Since name retrieval is not necessary at the time the participant 
sees the image, this task allows us to isolate differences in reaction time based on visual 
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complexity. For the pictures used in these experiments, the average reaction times for the 
monosyllabic and multisyllabic items were 608ms and 553ms respectively (by subjects: 
t(9) = 2.27, p < 0.05, by items: t(18) = 2.40, p < 0.05). It is important to note that the 
difference in reaction times is in the opposite direction to the predicted name length effect, 
so visual recognition processes should not provide a competing explanation for greater 
looking time to these items. We also collected visual complexity ratings for the study 
images from participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each image was rated on a scale 
from 1 to 7 (very simple to quite complex) by 10 native English speakers. The ratings for 
multisyllabic and monosyllabic images were not significantly different (Mann-Whitney 
U=58, p=.579). 
We determined the frequency of the object labels in the CHILDES database 
(MacWhinney, 2000), using the ChildFreq tool (Bååth, 2010). In transcripts in which the 
target child was 4-years old, the monosyllabic words occured, on average, 110 times per 
million words (range: 14 to 292 per million words) and the multisyllabic words occurred 
70 (range: 5 to 216) times per million words (t(18)=1.19, p>.2). In transcripts from 7-year-
olds these values were 80 (range: 0 to 366) and 169 (range: 0 to 889) occurences per 
million, respectively (t(18)=0.85, p>.4). 
Procedure and apparatus 
The experiment was conducted using a Tobii T60 screen-based eye tracker, with a 
sampling rate of 60Hz. Each session began with a calibration for the eye tracker using the 
Clearview software. After an acceptable calibration was obtained, the experiment was run 
in E-Prime. 
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Each trial began with a blue circle in the center of the screen. After the participant 
fixated on the circle for 500ms, it disappeared and the encoding phase of the trial began. 
The to-be-remembered display consisted of four images, one in each quadrant of the 
screen. This display stayed on-screen for five seconds.  Participants were instructed that 
during this part of the trial they should label each of the images out loud.  If children failed 
to do this on the practice trials, the experimenter prompted them to name the images while 
they were still on the screen. During the experimental trials, all adults and most children 
labeled the objects without prompting or feedback. If a child did not name the objects out 
loud, then the experimenter reminded her to label the images before the next trial. The 
five-second encoding phase was immediately followed by the test image. The participants’ 
task was to indicate whether the test image had been present in the four picture display 
which they had been asked to remember. Adult participants responded with a key press, 
while children gave verbal responses (“yes” or “no”). Responses were followed by visual 
feedback, a smiley face or a cross, which was accompanied by auditory feedback for the 
children (“nice job” or “better luck next time”). As incentives, children were given stickers 
for every ten correct responses. There were four practice trials and forty experimental 
trials. 
In each to-be-remembered picture display, there were two monosyllabic items and 
two multisyllabic items. Each image appeared eight times over the course of the 
experiment, twice in each location, and no pair of images appeared in the same display 
together more than twice. The test image was always taken from the set of 20 images that 
were used across trials in the encoding phase, so participants could not respond based on 
familiarity alone.  On half of the trials the test image had been present in the to-be-
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remembered display and on half it had not. Trial order was randomized for each 
participant. After completing the memory task, the children were shown each image again 
and asked to label it, to determine whether they associated the images with the expected 
names. We did not conduct the naming post-test with adults since 19 of the 20 images came 
from a database of images that had already been normed for name agreement in adults 
(Rossion & Pourtois, 2004) 
Results and Discussion 
An accuracy criterion of 80% correct responses was used for inclusion in this study; 
one 4-year-old did not meet this standard. Including all children, 4-year-olds’ average 
percentage of correct responses was 88.4%. After removing the score for the excluded 
participant, this percentage increased to 90.1%. Seven-year-olds’ average accuracy was 
97.6% and adults’ average accuracy was 97.7%. An analysis of variance on the log-odds 
transformed accuracy scores revealed a significant effect of age on accuracy, F(2,42) = 
13.41, p < 0.001. In light of this effect, we only analyzed eye gaze for trials with correct 
responses.  
We calculated total fixation time to each image during the five-second encoding 
phase by summing the fixations recorded for each quadrant. The validity metric provided 
by E-prime Extensions for Tobii was used to filter out samples that did not have valid 
measurements from both eyes. We also removed samples that recorded a gaze location in a 
different quadrant than both the sample before and the sample after, since such short 
fixation durations were likely to reflect measurement errors. Finally, if during the five 
second display, the total fixation time for an on-screen image was less than 150ms, the 
fixation time to that image was not considered in our analyses. Based on performance 
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profiles in various rapid picture identification paradigms (Fize, Fabre-Thorpe, Richard, 
Doyon, & Thorpe, 2005, Kirchner, & Thorpe, 2006; Potter, 1976; Potter, & Levy, 1969), we 
reasoned that if an image was fixated for less than this amount, the eye tracking data likely 
did not reflect substantial object processing, and that the image was either encoded 
extrafoveally or was not encoded at all. 
 
Figure 1. Experiment 1 total fixation times. Difference between the average total fixation 
time to the multisyllabic and monosyllabic items in each display when participants were 
explicitly labeling each image. Error bars display the standard error of the difference score. 
 
 
For each trial, we calculated the difference in the average total fixation time to the 
monosyllabic items and the multisyllabic items, excluding items that were fixated for less 
than 150ms (Figure 1). We analyzed the fixation time difference score using a series of 
mixed effects regressions, implemented using the lme4 library (Bates, & Maechler, 2010) in 
R, version 2.11.1 (R Development Core Team, 2010); p values were estimated assuming the 
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t values were drawn from a normal distribution, using the pnorm function. First, we 
conducted a mixed-effects linear regression with age group as a fixed effect, including 
random intercepts for subjects, and using Adults as the reference age group (Table 1). In 
this model, we found that the intercept was significantly greater than 0 (p<.01), indicating 
that adults looked longer to the multisyllabic items, and there were no significant effects of 
age (ps>.2). We conducted separate regressions for each age group to confirm that the 
name length effect occurred for the younger age groups as well. At each age level, the 
intercept was significantly greater than 0 (ps<.05), confirming participants looked longer 
to images with multisyllabic labels when naming them explicitly. 
 
Table 1. Fixed effects from mixed-effects linear regression models of total fixation time 
difference (multisyllabic – monosyllabic) with subjects as random effects. Intercepts 
significantly greater than 0 indicate a name length effects for that age group (*p<.05, 
***p<.001). 
 
Age Group Fixed Effect Estimate SE t value 
All (Adults as reference)     
 (Intercept) 151.83 30.70 4.945*** 
 Seven year olds -44.31 44.33 -1.000 
 Four year olds -69.53 45.69 -1.522 
     
Adults     
 (Intercept) 151.83 28.77 5.277*** 
     
Seven year olds     
 (Intercept) 107.52 29.88 3.599*** 
     
Four year olds     
 (Intercept) 82.30 38.44 2.141* 
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The findings from this control experiment confirm that the eye movement patterns 
are sensitive to naming in this task, setting the stage for investigating implicit naming 
during image encoding. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the name length effect would still be observed 
in the absence of an explicit naming instruction. For the adult subjects, we aimed to 
replicate Zelinsky and Murphy’s (2000) finding that adults look longer at pictures with 
longer names. By extending this design to 4- and 7-year-olds, we can determine the 
developmental trajectory of implicit labeling in this task. 
Method 
Participants 
As before, three age groups of participants were included in this experiment. 
Twenty 4-year-olds (4;5 to 4;10 years, M=4;9 years, 11 females), 20 7-year-olds (7;1 to 8;0 
years, M=7;8 years, nine females), and 20 adults (18 to 59 years, M=32 years, 13 females) 
participated. Six additional 4-year-olds participated in this study but were excluded from 
these analyses: five due to poor accuracy on the memory task and one for not following the 
task instructions. Also, data from two additional adult participants could not be used due to 
poor eye tracking. 
Materials, procedure, and apparatus 
The methods were identical to Experiment 1, except that participants were not told 
to name pictures out loud during the encoding phase of the trial, that is, the five second 
period while the to-be-remembered display was on the screen.  
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Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, we used an 80% accuracy criterion for inclusion in the study; 
five 4-year-olds did not meet this standard. Including all participants, 4-year-olds’ average 
correct response rate was 80.9%, after removing the scores for the five participants who 
did not meet the criterion, the  average correct response rate was 85.4%. The average 
correct response rate for adults was 94.0% and for 7-year-olds was 93.2%. An analysis of 
variance on log-odds transformed accuracy scores indicated that there was a significant 
effect of age, F(2,57)=14.83, p<0.001. Accuracy in Experiment 2 was substantially lower 
than in Experiment 1 (F(1,99) = 15.56, p < 0.001), and this effect did not interact with age, 
F(2,99) = 0.10,  p>.9. As in Experiment 1, only trials with correct responses were included 
in the eye-gaze analysis. 
As we did in Experiment 1, we calculated the difference between average total 
fixation time to the multisyllabic and monosyllabic images on each trial, excluding images 
with total fixation time of less than 150ms (Figure 2). We first conducted a mixed-effects 
linear regression with age group as a fixed effect and including random intercepts for 
subjects, and using Adults as the reference age group (Table 2). The analysis revealed a 
significant name length effect for the adults, as shown by the intercept (t=2.48, p<.05), and 
a significant difference in the name length effect between adults and 4-year-olds (t=-3.87, 
p<.001). 
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Figure 2. Experiment 2 total fixation times. Difference between the average total fixation 
time to the multisyllabic and monosyllabic items in each display when participants were 
not instructed to label the images. The final bar depicts the average difference in 
categorization speed (from the norming task described in Experiment 1) for these images. 
Error bars display the standard error of the difference score. 
 
 
We also conducted separate regressions for adults, 7-year-olds and 4-year-olds to 
investigate the possibility of implicit naming at each age level. Again, intercepts 
significantly greater than 0 indicated that participants looked longer at the images with 
multisyllabic labels, and so were likely to be retrieving object labels during the task. The 
expected name length effect was confirmed for the adults (Intercept=76.78ms, t=2.51, 
p<0.05), but was not observed in the younger age groups. In fact, the 4-year-olds looked 
significantly longer at the images of objects with shorter labels (Intercept=-101.11ms, 
t=2.77, p<0.01). 
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Table 2. Fixed effects from a mixed-effects linear regression model of total fixation time 
difference (multisyllabic – monosyllabic) with subjects as random effects. Intercepts 
significantly greater than 0 indicate a name length effects for that age group (*p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001). 
 
Age Group Fixed Effect Estimate SE t value 
All (Adults as reference)     
 (Intercept) 76.78 30.88 2.486* 
 Seven year olds -49.95 44.21 -1.130 
 Four year olds -177.89 46.02 -3.865*** 
     
Adults     
 (Intercept) 76.78 30.57 2.512* 
     
Seven year olds     
 (Intercept) 26.83 29.97 0.895 
     
Four year olds     
 (Intercept) -101.11 36.51 -2.770** 
 
To explore this unexpected reversal of the name length effect, we turned to the 
categorization speed norming task that we had conducted (described under Materials in 
Experiment 1). In this norming task, we found that participants actually responded more 
quickly to the monosyllabic visual stimuli than the multisyllabic items. If these differences 
in visual categorization had a larger effect on children’s fixation times, perhaps because of a 
reliance on visual memory strategies, then this would explain the reverse name length 
effect in 4-year-olds. Thus, we calculated the difference in average categorization time 
between the monosyllabic and multisyllabic items in each display and included this 
categorization speed difference score as a predictor for the fixation time difference score. 
We conducted a mixed-effects regression including age group and categorization speed 
difference score as fixed effects, with random intercepts for subjects and display 
combinations, including random slopes where appropriate (Table 3). This analysis yielded 
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an intercept of 161.67ms (t=2.43, p<.05), again indicating that adults looked longer at 
images of objects with longer names (Table 5). The categorization speed difference score 
was a marginally significant predictor overall (t=1.83, p=.07). Further, there were 
significant interactions of this predictor with age, for both 4- and 7-year-olds (ts>2, ps<.05), 
indicating that this index of visual complexity predicted fixation times differently for the 
different age groups. 
As before, we conducted separate regressions for each age group, now including the 
categorization speed difference score as a predictor (Table 3). In adults, the naming effect 
was observed (t=2.00, p<.05) and there was no significant effect of visual complexity, as 
measured by categorization speed. Seven-year-olds showed both a naming effect 
(Intercept=187.75ms, t=2.64, p<0.01), and a visual complexity effect (t=3.09, p<.01), 
indicating that they were likely to be implicitly labeling the images. Once visual complexity 
was accounted for, fixation times in 4-year-olds no longer showed any name length effects 
(t=0.87,  p>.3), but did show an effect of visual complexity (t=2.93, p<.01). These analyses 
were confirmed by conducting model comparisons, using ANOVAs, to assess whether 
models that include the visual complexity predictor explained significantly more variance 
than those without this predictor. For the four and 7-year-olds, including the visual 
complexity predictor explained significantly more of the variance (ps<.05), but this was not 
the case for the adults (p>.4). 
These data provide evidence of spontaneous name retrieval during the encoding of 
pictures into short term memory for adults and 7-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds.  
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Table 3. Fixed effects from a mixed-effects linear regression model of total fixation time 
difference (multisyllabic – monosyllabic) including categorization speed difference score as 
a predictor and with subjects and display combinations as random effects. Intercepts 
significantly greater than 0 indicate a name length effect for that age group, after 
accounting for differences in categorization speed across items (^p<.07, *p<.05, **p<.01). 
 
Age Group Fixed Effect Estimate SE t value 
All (Adults as 
reference) 
    
 (Intercept) 161.67 66.3
9 
2.435* 
 Categorization Speed Difference Score 1.57 0.86 1.826^ 
 Seven year olds 64.94 67.7
4 
0.959 
 Four year olds -52.86 77.7
3 
-0.680 
 Categorization Speed Diff. Score x Seven 
y.o. 
2.14 0.92 2.337* 
 Categorization Speed Diff. Score x Four y.o. 2.17 1.02 2.116* 
     
Adults     
 (Intercept) 141.83 70.8
7 
2.001* 
 Categorization Speed Diff. Score 1.20 0.96 1.247 
     
Seven year 
olds 
    
 (Intercept) 187.75 71.2
6 
2.635*
* 
 Categorization Speed Diff. Score 2.98 0.96 3.092*
* 
     
Four year olds     
 (Intercept) 69.76 80.6
8 
0.865 
 Categorization Speed Diff. Score 3.01 1.03 2.930*
* 
 
General Discussion 
 The results of these eye tracking experiments demonstrate that there is a 
developmental change in the use of verbal encoding for working memory tasks during the 
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early school years. We found that 7-year-olds, like adults, spontaneously engaged in verbal 
encoding in a short-term visual memory task. In contrast, 4-year-olds did not verbally 
encode the pictures, unless they were specifically instructed to do so. Experiment 1 
established that our fixation time index was in fact sensitive to naming in all three age 
groups, strengthening the conclusion that 4-year-olds were not activating verbal labels in 
Experiment 2. The age differences in name length effects, in combination with the visual 
complexity effects, suggest a developmental trajectory in which children begin with visual 
encoding strategies for short-term picture memory. Children start combining this with 
verbal encoding after entering school, and adults show an increased reliance on verbal 
labels. Below we discuss these findings in the context of prior studies on working memory 
development and implicit verbal encoding. 
 The results of this study are consistent with earlier work on the development of 
working memory, which has often shown that verbal memory strategies are not used for 
visual stimuli until the elementary school years. However, many of these prior findings 
relate to verbal rehearsal rather than verbal encoding, for instance, the repeated finding 
that verbal rehearsal emerges earlier for verbal rather than visual stimuli (e.g. Hitch, et al., 
1989; Hulme & Tordoff, 1989; Johnston, et al., 1987; but see Henry, et al., 2000). It is 
important to note that verbal rehearsal for visual stimuli necessarily depends on the 
emergence of verbal encoding. The current findings suggest that this tendency to recode 
visual stimuli into verbal representations is not present in preschoolers, offering one 
explanation for the absence of verbal rehearsal.  
Of course, it is also possible that verbal encoding in the absence of verbal rehearsal 
is not a particularly useful cognitive approach, and so it might be the acquisition of 
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rehearsal strategies that is the limiting factor for the emergence of verbal encoding. 
However, Macleod and colleagues found that the act of overtly verbally encoding the 
stimuli led to improved memory performance, compared to silent encoding (MacLeod, 
Gopie, Hourihan, Neary, & Ozubko, 2010). They suggest that labeling aids memory because 
it increases the distinctiveness of the representation. Similarly, in our study, memory 
performance improved for all age groups when they overtly labeled the images in the 
display, again suggesting that there might be benefits just from verbal encoding. The verbal 
encoding advantage becomes a disadvantage if there are multiple exemplars corresponding 
to the same label, e.g. a study set including several images of chairs (Lupyan, 2008), again 
indicating that verbal processes at encoding can affect memory performance independently 
of rehearsal. 
 Our results are also consistent with prior developmental work on the use of visual 
and linguistic representations in conceptual tasks. In a developmental study of visual 
imagery, Kosslyn (1976) found that adults were slower to perform a conceptual judgment 
when they were instructed to perform the task using visual imagery, compared to when 
that instruction was omitted. This suggests that visual imagery was not the default mode of 
representation for the adults in this study. On the other hand, first graders performed 
similarly whether or not they were instructed to use visual imagery. These results suggest 
that young children’s default encoding strategy might be more image-based than adults’, 
which is consistent with the current study. 
On the other hand, findings from a different paradigm suggest that even younger 
children, 18- and 24-month-old infants, do engage in verbal encoding for visual images. In a 
series of priming studies, Mani and colleagues found that viewing an image in silence can 
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effect a infants subsequent ability to process a word that is phonologically related to that 
image, even though the label of the orginal image was not spoken or heard (Mani & 
Plunkett, 2010; 2011; Mani, Durrant, & Floccia, 2012). Building on these results, we found 
that 24-month-old infants spontaneously activated the phonological form of image labels 
even in a completely non-communicative context without any explicit verbal labeling 
(Khan, Geojo, Wang, & Snedeker, submitted). 
 How can we account for the divergent pattern of development across tasks? Perhaps 
the diverse results across age groups can be reconciled by viewing verbal encoding in 
terms of its function in the task at hand. The studies that show implicit naming in 18- and 
24-month-olds require infants to attend to only one or two images at a time, and these 
images depict objects with which they are highly familiar (Khan, et al, submitted; Mani & 
Plunkett, 2010; 2011; Mani, et al., 2012). This context is very similar to the naming games 
that infants this age play with caregivers (“What’s that?”). The critical difference, of course, 
is that in these studies the game is silent, spontaneous and self-directed. Infants at this age 
are actively engaged in word learning, often through ostensive labeling of visual objects. 
Thus, perhaps it is functional for them to engage in verbal processing in these kinds of 
contexts. Naming games of this sort might provide an opportunity for infants to rehearse 
and consolidate word-meaning pairs. 
 In contrast, the current study uses a recognition memory task as a vehicle for 
investigating inner speech in 4-year-olds. While memory tasks appear to strongly elicit 
verbal encoding in adults, this may be a context in which verbal encoding is late developing. 
Verbal encoding as a memory strategy requires a sophisticated understanding of the goals 
of memory tasks and of how memory works. Even though verbal encoding aids memory 
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performance in young children, they might not spontaneously use a labeling strategy 
unless they are explicitly aware of its benefits. Monitoring the efficacy of a memory strategy 
appears to be late developing (Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984), and preschoolers do not 
have the benefit of formal instruction of memory strategies, so it is likely that 4-year-olds 
do not realize memory performance benefits from verbal encoding. Prior to this realization, 
there would be little incentive for a young child to devote resources to verbally recoding 
visual material in a memory task. 
While there are many issues to be resolved, the current findings provide a strong 
and novel constraint on our understanding of how working memory develops in early to 
middle childhood.  Specifically, it demonstrates that preschoolers not only fail to verbally 
rehearse but in fact do not even verbally encode visual stimuli that they are trying to 
remember. In contrast, young school-aged children do implicitly verbally encode images in 
a working memory task, as do adults. This suggests a developmental change in the 
mechanisms supporting working memory in the early school years, perhaps due to 
increases in metamemory following formal education (see Pressley, Borkowski, & Sullivan, 
1985; Schneider & Lockl, 2002; Schneider & Pressley, 1997 , for reviews). The presence or 
absence of implicit verbal representations during encoding can be detected using eye-
tracking. This tool can be used to assess the role of linguistic representations across a range 
of cognitive tasks and age groups to gain a more complete picture of the development of 
verbal encoding strategies. 
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Chapter 3. Spontaneous verbal labeling in 24-month-old infants2 
 
A central and controversial issue in cognitive science is the role of language in 
internal thought. Theorists as diverse as Mead (1934), Vygotsky (1934/1987), Whorf 
(1956) and Chomsky (2007) have proposed that language is the primary vehicle for 
internal thought. In contrast, others have argued that thought must occur over 
representations that are distinct from natural languages (Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 2002; 
Pinker, 1994). In some cases, the diverging opinions reflect differences in how the word 
“language” is defined—whether it picks out conceptual and semantic representations, 
syntax, phonology, or all of the above (see Jackendoff, 2002). Nevertheless, after 
definitional differences are sorted out and evolutionary claims are put aside, a clear 
empirical question remains: Does the specific form of the external language that we use to 
communicate play a role in our internal cognitive life? This question is often approached by 
finding languages with diverging syntactic and semantic categories and looking for 
differences in the performance of non-communicative tasks (see Gentner & Goldin-
Meadow, 2003 for examples), but it can also be addressed by testing whether the 
phonological forms of linguistic expressions are active during nonlinguistic tasks. 
There is no doubt that internal verbalization occurs. We have mental conversations 
with people who are absent, we silently coach ourselves during difficult tasks (“Eyes on the 
ball!”), and we use subvocal rehearsal as an short-term memory aid (Martínez Manrique & 
Vicente, 2010; Vicente & Martínez Manrique, 2011; Winsler, 2009). But several questions 
remain. How ubiquitous is verbal encoding: is it largely limited to strategic, metacognitive 
contexts like those above, or does it pervade our spontaneous thought? Does verbal 
                                                          
2
 The study in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Amy Geojo, Shanshan Wang and Jesse Snedeker. 
32 
 
encoding typically involve the activation of phonological representations or does internal 
thought use the semantic representations of language stripped free from their external 
trappings? And finally, when in development does spontaneous verbal encoding, outside of 
communicative contexts, first emerge? The present paper begins to explore this last 
question, by looking at the activation of verbal labels for visually-presented objects in 24-
month-old infants. 
While there is some evidence that adults spontaneously activate phonological 
representations in noncommunicative contexts, the data pattern is complex and 
ambiguous. In recognition memory tasks, the time spent looking at an object during the 
encoding phase is affected by name length of the object (Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). 
Although this task had only a 2.5 second delay and could be solved visually, this pattern 
indicates that adults encoded the pictures verbally, perhaps so they could verbally rehearse 
their labels. Critically, the authors found no effect of name length in a parallel visual-search 
task which had no memory demands. There is, however, some evidence for the activation 
of linguistic form during visual search. Specifically, the presence of homophonous 
competitors results in interference (e.g., more looks to a baseball bat when searching for an 
animal bat) suggesting that the lexical label of the picture has been retrieved (Meyer, Belke, 
Telling, & Humphreys, 2007). Curiously, visual search tasks are not influenced by 
phonological overlap between the target and distractors; persons searching for “candy” do 
not linger on candles (Telling, 2008). This raises the possibility that the homophone effects 
either reflect activation at the lexical level (rather than at the phonological level) or depend 
on the participants’ metalinguistic awareness of homophony. 
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The origin of internal verbal representations has been a central theoretical issue in 
developmental psychology. Vygotsky (1934/1987) proposed that children initially use 
language solely as a social tool, with internal speech developing gradually from external 
dialog. The first step toward internalization occurs at around two or three when children 
begin talking aloud to themselves. This private speech becomes quieter, less frequent, more 
elliptical, and more covert during the late preschool and early elementary years (Berk, 
1986; Winsler & Naglieri, 2003; see Winsler, 2009 for review). Researchers working within 
the Vygotskyian tradition interpret these changes in private speech as evidence for the 
emergence of internalized verbal thought (see e.g., Fernyhough, 2009).  
However, there is little direct evidence that internal verbalization is absent before 
the rise and fall of private speech. Unlike adults, young children do not report thinking in 
words (Flavell, Green, Flavell, & Grossman, 1997; Manfra & Winsler, 2006), but this could 
reflect a failure to understand the question or introspect, rather than the absence of 
internal verbalization (Flavell & Wong, 2009). In memory studies with pictoral stimuli, 
preschoolers make errors based on visual similarity but do not to show effects of word 
length, phonological similarity or verbal suppression, suggesting that they do not use 
internal verbalization even in those tasks where adults rely on it (Conrad, 1971; Ford & 
Silber, 1994; Hayes & Schulze, 1977; Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Hitch, Halliday, Dodd, & 
Littler, 1989; but see Henry, Tuner, Smith, & Leather, 2000; Hulme, Silvester, Smith, & Muir, 
1986). This pattern, however, could reflect a failure to use verbal rehearsal or retrieval 
strategies, rather than the absence of verbal encoding (Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Johnston & 
Conning, 1990: Nairne, 1990). In fact, in picture memory studies 5-year-olds have been 
observed making silent lip movements as the pictures are presented, suggesting that they 
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are retrieving their verbal labels (Locke & Fehr, 1970; but see Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 
1966). 
In this paper, we explore a fundamentally different hypothesis about the 
development of internal verbalization, one that is rooted in psycholinguistic research and 
the information-processing tradition. Psycholinguists construe language as a series of 
linked representations (phonological, lexical, syntactic and semantic) which are 
constructed during comprehension and production (see e.g., Alario, Costa, Ferreira, & 
Pickering, 2006; Altmann, 2001; Snedeker, 2009). Language development involves, among 
other things, acquiring connections between levels, such as the mappings between 
phonological word forms and the concept that a word expresses (Jackendoff, 2002). Once a 
connection has been acquired, activation at one level of representation can result in 
activation of the linked representation, as it must for successful word comprehension or 
production. Covert speech occurs when lexical and phonological representations are 
constructed without giving rise to articulatory plans (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004). On this 
construal, the representational basis for internal verbalization is available as soon as 
language acquisition begins, raising the possibility that older infants might already think in 
words.  To explore this prediction, we looked for evidence of phonological activation in 24-
month-olds who were passively viewing pictures. 
The present study builds directly on experiments by Mani and Plunkett (2010; 
2011; Mani, 2010) which show that infant word recognition is sensitive to phonological 
and phono-semantic priming. For example, in the phonological priming study, infants were 
shown a prime image (e.g. a picture of a cup), unaccompanied by an explicit label, followed 
by split screen with two images (a cat and a house), one of which was explicitly labeled 
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(“cat”). Infants’ looking times to the target image (cat) were affected by whether or not the 
label is phonologically related to the name of the previous silent image: 18-month-olds 
show phonological facilitation, while 24-month-olds show phonological interference.  
For these effects to emerge, infants had to activate the label of the prime image, 
which was never spoken aloud. Thus some form of internal verbal activity occurred. Mani 
and Plunkett (2010) interpret this activity as implicit naming, and draw a parallel to the 
homophone effects observed in adults by Meyer and colleagues (2007). However, this task 
is different from Meyer’s in a fundamental way: the unlabeled prime is embedded in an 
overt word-recognition task, rather than a non-linguistic search task. Throughout the 
experiment infants heard an alternating stream of labeled targets and unlabeled primes. 
Consequently, infants may have generated labels for primes because they expected to hear 
these words or because they understood this task as a labeling game and were trying to 
play along. In fact, in adults, unlabeled pictures produce phonological interference when 
they are embedded in a linguistic task, like picture naming (Meyer & Damian, 2007; 
Morsella & Miozzo, 2002), but not when they are embedded in a nonlinguistic task like 
visual search (Telling, 2008; see also Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). Thus, the prior 
preferential-looking studies do not answer the core question that motivates the present 
experiment: Do infants verbalize their experiences in non-linguistic contexts, or do they do 
so only in expectation of hearing or producing external labels?  
The current study addresses this question by looking for phono-semantic priming in 
24-month-olds in a non-linguistic task in which objects are never labeled for the child and 
the child is never asked to produce a label. In phono-semantic priming, the prime is 
phonologically related to an intermediary that is semantically related to the target; the 
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intermediary is never explicitly presented during the task (e.g. cup-cat-dog). The 
phenomenon of phono-semantic priming has been observed both in adult and child 
language processing (Huang & Snedeker, 2011; Marslen-Wilson, 1987; Yee & Sedivy, 2006), 
and has been observed in 24-month-old infants using the preferential-looking priming 
paradigm described above (Mani, 2010; Mani, Durrant, & Floccia, 2012). Phono-semantic 
priming is an attractive tool for examining implicit phonological activation because phono-
semantic relations are more difficult for participants to notice than phonological 
relationships, and therefore less available for strategic processes. Nevertheless, phono-
semantic priming still relies on activating the phonological label of the prime. 
The present study used a preferential-looking paradigm modeled on Mani (2010); 
infants saw a prime image followed by a split-screen of two images, one of which was 
phono-semantically related to the prime on half the trials. There was, however, one critical 
difference in our paradigm: none of the pictures (targets or primes) were labeled for the 
child. If infants’ free-viewing of the split-screen differs based on whether or not one of the 
images is phono-semantically related to the previous image, this will provide strong 
evidence that phonological labels are spontaneously implicitly activated when infants 
encounter familiar visual objects. Such a finding would be consistent with the view that 
linguistic representations are recruited for internal thought, even in the early stages of 
language acquisition.  
Method 
 Participants 
Twenty four 24-month-olds from English speaking households participated in this 
study. An additional four infants were tested but could not be included in the final dataset: 
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one infant did not complete the experiment, and three were excluded due to technical 
failures or experimenter error. 
 Materials 
Ten prime-target-distractor triplets of color images were compiled (see Appendix B 
for a complete item list). In each triplet, the prime was phono-semantically related to the 
target; for example, cup is phono-semantically related to dog because the label “cup” shares 
its phonological onset with “cat”, and cats are semantically related to dogs. The 
intermediary or subprime, in this case cat, is never mentioned nor visually presented 
during the task. The distractor item was phonologically, semantically and phono-
semantically unrelated to both the prime and the target. An unrelated control version of 
each item was created by shuffling the prime and target images between items, such that 
they were no longer phono-semantically related (and were also not phonologically or 
semantically related). Distractors were yoked to the target image during this shuffling. 
Since nothing is labeled during this task, an image is deemed the target simply by virtue of 
having been phono-semantically related to the prime in the original item triplets that were 
created. Each participant saw each item in either the related-prime or the unrelated-prime 
condition. Four experimental lists were created such that, for every item, related-prime and 
unrelated-prime conditions and target position on the screen were counterbalanced across 
participants. 
The items used in this study were adapted from Mani (2010), with some 
substitutions due to differences between British and American English. The words that 
were relevant to the task (primes, targets, distractors and subprimes) were, on average, 
produced by 75% of 24-month-olds in the norming study for the MacArthur-Bates 
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Communicative Development Inventory (Dale & Fenson, 1996). Further, following the 
preferential-looking task, participants’ knowledge of the words relevant to the task was 
confirmed by asking the caregiver to complete a vocabulary checklist, which indicated that 
these words were comprehended by an average of 97 percent of the infants tested (range 
across items = 88 percent – 100 percent). While caregivers completed this checklist, infants 
were asked to name the prime images that had been presented during the study. Critically, 
this naming task occurred after the preferential looking task. Images were presented in a 
booklet and infants were only prompted with questions such as “what is this?” or “can you 
help me name this?”. Five infants did not complete this task because they were too shy or 
tired. The pictures were correctly named by an average of 92% of the infants who 
completed this task (range = 84% – 100% by picture). 
In order to rule out the possibility that direct semantic or visual similarity between 
the related-prime and the target could account for differences from the unrelated control 
condition, we collected adult ratings for these items on Amazon Mechanical Turk. For every 
item, the semantic relatedness between the related-prime and the target, the unrelated-
prime and the target, and the related-subprime and the target were assessed with ten 
adults rating each pair on a scale from 1-7 (unrelated to highly related). The visual 
similarity between the related-prime and the target, and the unrelated-prime and the 
target, were also assessed. These ratings confirmed that neither the related and unrelated 
primes were semantically related to the targets; mean ratings were 1.54 and 1.33 
respectively, and these ratings were not significantly different from each other, t(9)=0.96, 
p>.3. Further, in both cases, the semantic relatedness ratings were significantly lower than 
for the subprime-target pairs (M=5.61, ts>23, ps<.001). The visual similarity ratings did not 
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significantly differ between the related and unrelated prime conditions, mean ratings were 
1.43 and 1.51 respectively, t(9)=0.34, p>.7. 
Procedure 
Participants sat on their caregiver’s lap on a chair approximately 6 feet from the 
projector screen; caregivers were asked to keep their eyes closed for the duration of the 
task. A video camera immediately below the screen recorded the child’s face so that their 
eye movements could be coded. Audio that was played through speakers behind the screen 
was also recorded to the videotape. 
The experiment procedure was modeled on Mani (2010). Each participant viewed 5 
trials in the related-prime condition and 5 trials in the unrelated-prime (control) condition 
with trial order randomized. The sequence of events within a trial is depicted in Figure 3. 
First, the participant saw the prime image presented in the center of the screen for 1500ms 
with no sound. Next, a blank screen appeared for 200ms, followed by the target and the 
distractor image. These images appeared on-screen side by side for 2550ms, with left-right 
order of the two pictures counterbalanced across items and experimental lists. 50ms after 
the target and distractor images appeared, a pre-recorded attention-getter in a female 
voice was played, such as “oh” or “ah”. Finally, the participant saw a blank screen until the 
experimenter judged s/he was looking at the center of the screen, at which point the prime 
image for the next trial was presented. The related and unrelated prime conditions only 
differed with respect to the pairing of prime and target images. 
Following the preferential-looking task, caregivers completed the vocabulary 
checklist. During this time, infants were shown the prime images again and asked to name 
them. 
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Figure 3. Schematic of a trial in related-prime condition (prime cup, subprime cat, and 
target item dog). In the unrelated-prime condition, the sequence remains the same except 
for the prime image, which would be replaced with a picture of a house. 
 
 
Coding 
Eye movements were coded from the videotape using frame-by-frame viewing 
(33ms per frame). Fixations during the target-distractor screen were coded as left, right, 
center or away. Frames where the participant’s pupils were not clearly visible were coded 
as track loss. Coding began 50ms after the target and distractor images appeared on-
screen, at the point when the attention-getter was heard, and continued for 2000ms. Trials 
were excluded if the participant had not looked at the prime image or if there was more 
than 50% track loss during the critical time window (3.3% of trials). No participants were 
excluded for showing a side bias (> 80% looking to either the left or right side of the screen 
across the ten trials). 
Results 
For each frame between 50ms and 2050ms from target-distractor image onset, we 
noted whether the participant was looking at the target for each trial (see Figure 4). 
Frames where the participant was not looking at either the target or the distractor were 
excluded from the analyses (5% of related-prime condition frames, 4% of unrelated-prime 
condition frames). 
Target-Distracter 
“Oooh” at 50ms after onset 
2500ms 
Blank Screen 
No sound 
200ms 
Prime 
No sound 
1500ms 
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Figure 4. Probability of looking at the target (rather than the distractor) over time. The 
solid horizontal bar depicts the time region where infants were more likely to look at the 
target when it was unrelated to the prime (p < .05, using parametric cluster test, see text). 
 
Based on the prior findings from the word comprehension task (Mani, 2010), we 
expected that phono-semantic priming would result in reduced looks to the target in the 
related-prime condition. However, because of the open-ended nature of our task, we did 
not have an a priori hypothesis about when this priming effect would emerge. Since our 
participants were not directed to look at either of the images, their fixation patterns cannot 
be predicted on the basis of the word comprehension studies. Instead their fixations reflect 
processes that occur spontaneously during passive viewing (e.g., object recognition or 
spontaneous verbal labeling). These processes could be synchronized to the onset of the 
visual stimuli in multiple ways. Thus, we needed a statistical approach which would allow 
us to compare looking patterns in the related-prime and unrelated-prime conditions across 
the entire time period when the images were present.  
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We adopted a strategy for identifying time windows with significant priming effects 
that allowed for flexibility while maintaining the probability of Type I error at p<.05. 
Specifically, we used a non-parametric cluster-size statistical test following Maris and 
Oostenveld (2007), which permits testing each time point without inflating the likelihood 
of generating a false positive. For each time point, we performed a logistic mixed-effects 
regression on fixations to the target, with prime condition as a fixed effect and subjects and 
items as random effects, implemented using the lme4 library (Bates, & Maechler, 2010) in 
R, version 2.11.1 (R Development Core Team, 2010). Time points were grouped into larger 
windows by identifying clusters of adjacent time points with significant prime condition 
effects (p <.05, two-tailed), and the z statistic for each time point within the cluster was 
summed to yield a summary statistic for the cluster. To determine the probability of 
observing a cluster of that size by chance, we conducted 1000 simulations where the 
condition labels for each trial were randomly assigned. For each of the 1000 sets of re-
shuffled data, we implemented the analysis described above and saved the summary 
statistic for the largest cluster that was identified. A cluster of time points from the original 
data was considered to show a significant effect of prime condition if its summed z score 
was greater than the summary statistic of the largest cluster found in 95% of the re-
shuffled simulations. Thus the total probability of a false positive is kept below .05. The p-
values reported here reflect the proportion of re-shuffled simulations that found clusters 
with summary statistics as large or larger than the reported cluster. 
Using this technique, we found fewer looks to the target in the related-prime 
condition from 550-850ms following target-distractor picture onset (p<.05). To test for 
weaker but long-lasting priming effects, we repeated the analysis described above with a 
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relaxed alpha of .2 for each time point, while maintaining an overall alpha of .05 for each 
cluster. In this analysis, we observed an effect of prime condition in the 517-1383ms time 
window (p<.01), again reflecting an inhibitory priming effect, consistent with the phono-
semantic priming results from Mani (2010). 
Discussion 
This study explored whether infants engage in spontaneously verbal encoding in a 
non-communicative and non-linguistic task. Infants saw a stream of pictures, none of which 
were labeled. Nevertheless, their looking patterns on the test trials were influenced by the 
names of the objects that they had previously seen. Specifically, when the label of the prime 
object was phonologically related to a close semantic associate of the target, infants were 
less likely to look at this object. Since phono-semantic priming depends upon the 
phonological form of the prime, this result indicates that infants internally generated the 
labels for the visually-presented images. Thus, early in development, language is active, 
even outside of communicative contexts or linguistic tasks, suggesting it may play a role in 
internal thought. 
These results support the hypothesis we derived from the psycholinguistic model: 
since internal verbalization involves a subset of the processes involved in language 
production, it should emerge early in language acquisition. Our findings also provide 
additional evidence that the 24-month-old infants have a lexicon with the architectural 
features required to support phono-semantic priming (e.g., phonological neighborhood 
structure and a close coupling of phonological and semantic representations), confirming 
the findings from word-recognition tasks (Mani et al., 2012; Mani, 2010). 
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There are several possible paths from phono-semantic priming to the observed 
decrease in target looking in this task. It is worth noting that studies using a similar 
paradigm by Mani and colleagues have also found a decrease in looking to targets following 
phonologically and phono-semantically related primes (Mani, 2010; Mani & Plunkett, 2011; 
c.f. Mani et al., 2012). In particular, they find a decrease in target looking in studies with 24-
month-old infants where there is only a single phoneme overlap between the prime and 
subprime or target, which matches the conditions of the current study. In their studies, 
Mani & Plunkett (2011) and Mani (2010) suggest that the phonological activation of the 
prime label ultimately inhibits activation of the target label, delaying word recognition. 
However, it is unclear that inhibition of the target label should necessarily lead to a 
decrease in looking in the current study, which does not involve word recognition. Another 
possibility is that accessing the prime label actually facilitated processing of the target 
object, such that infants were able to retrieve the label more quickly and look away sooner. 
This explanation is consistent with fixation patterns in Zelinsky & Murphy’s (2000) 
recognition memory task, where adults looked less at objects which required less time to 
verbalize. 
While these findings challenge Vygotsky’s specific claims about the age at which 
internal speech emerges (1934/1987), they lend support to his broad proposal that 
external symbols play a central role in internal mental life.  Researchers in the Vygotskian 
tradition have argued that internal verbal representations emerge as private speech 
declines between the ages of 4 and 7 (Winsler, 2009). There are two ways in which this 
theory could be modified to account for our findings. First, one could retain the premise 
that private speech is a gateway into internal speech and draw a theoretical distinction 
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between spontaneous verbal activity, which is present in infancy, and true internal speech. 
This would require further development of the theory and a re-examination of prior 
research which has used phonological representation as an index of internal speech (Al-
Namlah, Fernyhough, & Mein, 2006). Second, one could seek another explanation for the 
disappearance of private speech such as the acquisition of taboos about talking to oneself 
(Duncan & Tarulli, 2009). 
Our data raise new questions about how verbal encoding changes during 
development. In adults, the phonological encoding of pictoral stimuli is well-established in 
short-term memory tasks and language production tasks, but the results from nonlinguistic 
visual-search tasks are inconsistent. For example, Meyer et al. (2007) found that adults 
looked longer at distractors when they were homophonous with the target, suggesting that 
participants were accessing the image labels. On the other hand, Telling (2008) failed to 
find any effects of partial phonological overlap between target and distractor labels in a 
range of similar tasks, suggesting that adults may not be activating phonological labels 
during visual search. In another visual search experiment, Zelinsky and Murphy (2000) did 
not find effects of verbal activation in adult participants. In contrast, our results 
demonstrate that infants implicitly name the objects that they see in a nonlingustic task 
with no memory component. We have considered three explanations for this difference. 
First, the free-viewing task could be more sensitive to the effects of implicit verbal 
labeling than the visual-search task. While more research is needed to evaluate this 
possibility, our initial studies suggest that it is wrong.  We have found that adults show the 
same pattern of effects in a free-viewing task as they do in the visual-search task: greater 
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looking to homophonous targets but not to phonologically-related words (Khan, Fitts, & 
Snedeker, in prep.). 
Second, over development we may gain the ability to limit the activation of linguistic 
representations to contexts where they are useful (short-term memory tasks) or necessary 
(word production tasks). This shift could be part of a broader developmental change in the 
ability to use goals to control cognitive processes, linked to the maturation of prefrontal 
cortex and the development of executive functions (see e.g., Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 
2008). 
Finally, perhaps adults, like infants, spontaneously activate linguistic labels of 
objects they see, but this activation is undetectable with current paradigms because the 
adult lexicon is so much larger than the child’s. A typical 24-month-old produces about 300 
words (Dale & Fenson, 1996), a typical adult knows about 60,000 (e.g., Miller, 1996; Nagy & 
Herman, 1987; Pinker, 1994). As a result, a given word will have many more phonological 
neighbors for an adult than for a 2-year-old, thus the priming effect for any given 
phonological neighbor may be diminished. This hypothesis could explain why adults in 
visual-search tasks show effects of homophony (Meyer et al., 2007) but not phonological 
overlap (Telling, 2008): homophones necessarily have a greater degree of phonological 
overlap than non-homophonous pairs.  
The use of spontaneous verbal encoding in infancy is relevant to our broader 
understanding of the relationship between language and thought. The influence of language 
on thought is often studied by looking at how speakers of different languages perform on 
what appear to be non-linguistic cognitive tasks. When differences between populations 
are found they are often interpreted as evidence that language affects the concepts that are 
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available or salient to the speaker (see Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003 for examples). Our 
findings suggest another possible explanation: linguistic representations may become 
active in many tasks which do not explicitly require language comprehension or 
production. When this happens, differences in the language itself may influence 
performance, even if speakers of both languages have access to the same conceptual 
representations. This account correctly predicts that verbal interference can disrupt cross-
linguistic cognitive differences (see e.g., Winawer et al., 2007) and that a bilingual’s pattern 
of performance will often depend on the language in which they are tested (Boroditsky, 
Ham, & Ramscar, 2002; Barner, Iganaki, & Li, 2009). Such verbal interference effects have 
not been explored by developmental psychologists, but the present results suggest that 
they may begin very early in life. 
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Chapter 4. Implicit activation of verbal labels during visual object 
processing3 
 
The connection between a familiar concept and its verbal label is often so engrained 
that going from the former to the latter feels automatic. The process of retrieving the word 
“apple” when talking about the familiar red fruit, for example, typically goes by effortlessly 
and unnoticed. The fluid transfer from concepts to words in speech production and from 
words to concepts in comprehension leads to the question of how these representations 
interact in the absence of communication. Does calling up a concept spontaneously lead to 
activating the corresponding word form? 
The role of linguistic representations in our mental lives has been a topic of 
extensive debate. From Whorf (1956) to Chomsky (2007), there have been numerous 
theories placing language at the heart of cognition, certainly viewing it as more than a mere 
tool for communication. The specific proposals vary widely on the nature of the interaction 
between linguistic and nonlinguistic representations, but they share the notion that 
language is involved in internal thought. One starting point for investigating this issue is to 
explore what contexts elicit internal linguistic representations and what form these 
representations take. Introspection tells us that verbal representations are sometimes used 
in non-communicative contexts. Whether it is in mentally rehearsing to-be-remembered 
material or in the conscious experience of an inner speech stream, it is clear that we 
sometimes involve language in our inner thoughts. However, there are cases where 
introspection fails us, where we do not have clear access to the representations we rely on. 
For example, the nature of the representations underlying mental imagery was the topic of 
                                                          
3
 The study described in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Whitney Fitts and Jesse Snedeker. 
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a longstanding debate (e.g., Kosslyn, 1994; Pylyshyn, 1973). So, the question remains: is 
activating linguistic representations in silent thinking a widespread phenomenon or 
something that only occurs during specific tasks? The current study starts to bridge this 
gap by investigating verbal activation during a simple visual object processing task. If 
verbal representations are recruited just from encoding a visual object, a process that 
occurs constantly in our daily lives, then it would appear that verbal representations are 
indeed ubiquitous in our internal thoughts. 
There is some work that suggests verbal labels for visual images are spontaneously 
recruited during seemingly nonverbal tasks. Noizet and Pynte (1976) used a free viewing 
task, in which participants were simply told to look at each picture until they had 
recognized the drawing.  They found that people spent longer looking at pictures with 
longer names than those with shorter names. However, it is unclear whether the 
participants interpreted the instruction to silently identify the objects as a request to 
implicitly label the images. A similar word length effect was observed by Zelinsky and 
Murphy (2000) in the context of a recognition memory task. Adults saw four pictures on a 
screen followed by a 2.5 second pause and then judged whether a probe image was one of 
the original four. During the encoding phase of this task, adults spent longer inspecting 
images with multisyllabic labels than those with monosyllabic labels, both in terms of 
initial gaze duration and in terms of total fixation time. Additionally, in a second 
experiment, Zelinsky and Murphy (2000) replicated this effect with novel face-name pairs, 
which participants had learned before beginning the recognition memory task. The novel 
pairings ruled out the possibility that fixation durations were actually determined by 
conceptual complexity or other possible confounding factors. 
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There is also some evidence of verbal encoding during visual search tasks. Meyer, 
Belke, Humphreys and Telling (2007) found increased visual attention to distracters that 
were homophonous with the target, even though verbal labels were not presented during 
the search task. The most obvious way of accounting for this result is via verbal encoding of 
the target image, since the targets and distracters were unrelated except for the shared 
label. However, other studies have failed to find verbalization effects in visual search. In a 
series of experiments, using the same visual search paradigm as Meyer and colleagues, 
Telling (2008) did not observe any competition from distractor images whose labels were 
phonologically similar to label of the target image, either in terms of onset overlap or rime 
overlap. Surprisingly, these effects were absent even when written words were presented 
rather than images, suggesting perhaps that participants developed specific encoding 
strategies over the course of the task. The absence of phonological encoding during visual 
search is also reported in Zelinsky and Murphy (2000). Participants who learned the face-
name pairs (see above) also completed a visual search task with these items. However, the 
visual search task did not yield any name length effects, suggesting that participants were 
not labeling the faces as they searched for the target. 
 These apparent discrepancies can be reconciled if we assume that implicit labeling 
is a  task-specific strategy that is used under a fairly limited set of circumstances. Short-
term memory tasks, such as the recognition memory task used by Zelinksy and Murphy 
(2000), lend themselves to using phonological rehearsal, perhaps encouraging participants 
to strategically encode the pictures using verbal labels. Visual search, on the other hand, 
only requires holding a single item in memory and so does not necessitate such strategies. 
While intuitively attractive, this explanation is incomplete as it does not account for 
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increased attention towards homophonous distractors during visual search (Meyer et al., 
2007). We can gain some traction on this issue by considering different levels of 
representation in lexical access, for example, distinguishing between word-form level 
representations and phoneme representations (e.g. Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). It is 
possible that the homophone effects reflect some level of lexical activation, in the absence 
of phonological (phoneme level) activation. In this case, the failure to find evidence for 
implicit phonological activation in visual search tasks (Telling, 2008; Zelinsky & Murphy, 
2000) does not conflict with the homophone effect in a similar task. Taken together, these 
results suggest that implicit lexical activation occurs spontaneously across a range of visual 
tasks, including both memory and search tasks, but phonological access only occurs in 
tasks like short-term memory tasks, which prompt the use of verbal encoding strategies. 
 Recent results from infant studies, however, are at odds with this account of implicit 
verbalization. In a series of studies, Mani has found that 18- and 24-month-old infants 
activate the phonological label for objects that are visually presented (Mani, & Plunkett, 
2010; 2011; Mani et al, 2012). On critical trials in these studies, a single prime image is 
displayed in silence; this is followed by a split screen of the target and distractor images, 
and then the target object is labeled. Infants’ looking to the target is affected by the 
phonological relationship between the labels for the target and prime images, even though 
the prime label is never heard. This phonological priming is present even in a completely 
non-linguistic version of this task where neither the target images nor the primes images 
are labeled (Khan, Geojo, Wang, & Snedeker, submitted), indicating that 24-month old 
infants spontaneously recruit verbal representations in a non-communicative context.. 
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 There are two explanations for why phonological activation is absent in visual 
search tasks with adults but present in visual tasks with infants. First, adults might be less 
likely than infants to spontaneously activate linguistic representations in non-
communicative contexts. This conclusion is at odds with other research that suggests an 
increase in the use of internal verbal representations through childhood; for example, 
preschool aged children are less likely than adults to rely on verbal representations in 
working memory tasks (for review see Hitch, & Halliday, 1983). However, it is possible that 
infants spontaneously engage in verbal encoding, whereas adults only recruit linguistic 
representations in contexts where it is strategic to do so. 
A second possibility is that the paradigm that was used in the infant studies is more 
sensitive to phonological activation than the method employed in the visual search studies. 
The preferential-looking paradigm used by Mani and colleagues presented the prime image 
in isolation, so the infant only attended to a single item at the point of implicit labeling. In 
contrast, in the visual search tasks, adults would need to access the labels of four images 
presented simultaneously for verbalization effects to be detected. Implicit verbalization 
effects in visual search tasks are investigated by measuring the fixation time to the non-
target distractors (e.g., the homophone distractors in Meyer, et al., 2007). Thus, the chances 
of finding verbalization effects are obscured by all of the other factors that cause the 
participants to move their eyes away from a distractor image, such as color or shape. For 
example, in Zelinsky and Murphy’s (2000) visual search paradigm, a name length effect 
might not be detected in participants’ eye movements as they might move their eyes away 
from a long-name distractor or linger longer on a short-name distractor based on visual 
features. In contrast, in the priming paradigm, implicit verbalization is probed by 
53 
 
measuring looking times to the target image, so the task demands do not draw eye 
movements away in a manner that reduces sensitivity to verbalization effects. 
 The current study explores implicit verbal activation in adults using a paradigm that 
allows direct comparison to the infant results. Using a trial structure based on the studies 
by Mani and colleagues, we examined priming based on the labels of images presented in 
silence. To the extent that such priming is observed, we can conclude that adults 
spontaneously accessed these verbal representations. We included both homophone and 
phonological-onset overlap priming in this study. As we noted above, the presence of 
homophone effects in visual search tasks, and the absence of phonological effects, suggests 
that lexical (word-form) representations might be recruited more promiscuously than 
phonological  ones.  This hypothesis suggests that a similar discrepancy might be present in 
a viewing task as well. In contrast, if adults perform this task in the same way that infants 
do (and activate phonological representations) then we should see phonological-onset 
priming, as well as homophone priming in our adult participants.  
Experiment 1 
The first experiment in this study adapted Mani and Plunkett’s (2010) preferential 
looking paradigm to study implicit label activation in adults. By keeping the procedure 
similar to the infant studies, which have found evidence of phonological activation during 
picture viewing, we can investigate whether the absence of such findings in adults should 
be attributed to developmental change or to differences across tasks. While the basic trial 
structure used in this experiment paralleled that of the infant studies, there were some 
necessary changes. First, a memory component was added to the design so that adults had 
some motivation to attend to the images. The number of to-be-remembered images (84 
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images per block) exceeded the bounds of working memory, so verbal rehearsal could not 
be an effective memorization strategy and therefore should not lead to phonological 
activation beyond the spontaneous initial encoding of the items. Second, in addition to 
prime-target pairs that shared their phonological onset (cherry, chair), participants also 
saw three other types of prime-target pairs: homophones (bat-baseball instrument, bat-
animal), semantically-related pairs (chicken, egg) and phono-semantically related pairs 
(log, key). Including different trials types meant that there were fewer trials instantiating 
any single relationship, making it less likely that adults would become aware of the 
relevant patterns. Also, the homophone and semantically-related items allowed us to make 
comparisons to the visual search studies in adults which found effects of both of these 
types of relatedness (Meyer, et al., 2007). Finally, we increased the amount of phonological 
overlap in the phonological-onset and phono-semantic items. All phonologically related 
primes and targets, and primes and subprimes for the phono-semantic condition, 
overlapped in at least the first two phonemes, rather than just the initial segment. This was 
necessary due to the considerably larger size of adult vocabularies, compared to infant 
vocabularies. A single initial segment is likely to be shared across many more words for an 
adult and so, due to fan effects in spreading activation (Anderson, 1974), the priming effect 
for any one word would be considerably weaker. Increasing the amount of overlap 
increases the strength of the priming effect. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-two native English speakers between 18 and 30 years old (20 female, mean 
age 21 years) were recruited from the Harvard University subject pool. An additional two 
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participants completed the experiment but were not included due to excessive eye-tracking 
data loss (more than 50% unusable trials in at least one condition). Participants either 
received partial course-credit or $10 as compensation. 
Materials 
Each trial in this study consisted of a triplet of images: the prime, the target and the 
distractor. Eighty-four triplets were created in four different categories, which were 
defined based on the relationship between the prime and the target:  12 homophone 
triplets, 24 phonological onset triplets, 24 semantic triplets, and 24 phono-semantic 
triplets. For homophone triplets, the prime and target shared the same verbal label but 
were unrelated in meaning (e.g. bat-sports equipment and bat-animal). There were fewer 
items in the homophone category than in the other categories due to the difficulty of 
finding depictable homophone pairs with reliable name agreement. Phonological onset 
triplets contained prime and target images whose labels share the same initial sounds but 
are semantically unrelated (e.g. cherry and chair), while semantic primes and targets were 
related conceptually but not phonologically (e.g. chicken and egg).  In phono-semantic 
triplets, the label for the prime image shared its phonological onset with an unseen 
intermediary (the subprime) which was semantically related to the target.  For example, 
log would be used as a prime for key, with lock as the subprime, which was neither seen nor 
heard. In all cases, the distractor image was semantically and phonologically unrelated to 
both the prime and the target. Since prior studies have found a correlation between looking 
time and word-length (Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000), distractor images in each triplet were 
chosen such that their labels matched the target in terms of the number of syllables. 
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For each category, half the trials were presented in the Related Prime condition, in 
which the prime and target were related as described above. The other half were presented 
in the Unrelated Prime condition, in which the prime, target and distractor were all 
phonologically and semantically unrelated to each other. Unrelated Prime trials were 
created by shuffling the prime images, such that they were no longer presented in the same 
trial as the related targets. For example, in the Related Prime condition, bacon-baby-igloo 
and penny-pencil-lighthouse are presented as prime-target-distractor combinations, and in 
the Unrelated Prime condition these are shuffled into penny-baby-igloo and bacon-pencil-
lighthouse. Target-distractor pairings were held constant across Related and Unrelated 
conditions. The experiment was split into three blocks of 28 trials, each including an equal 
number of Related Prime and Unrelated Prime trials from the different categories, 
presented in random order. Eight experimental lists were created such that, for each item, 
condition (Related Prime or Unrelated Prime), target position (left or right) and block 
order were counterbalanced across participants. 
Phonological relatedness assessment. For the phonological onset prime-target pairs 
and the phono-semantic primes and subprimes, shared phonological onset was defined as 
overlap of the first consonant-vowel or vowel-consonant sounds of the word.  Intuitions 
about initial phonological overlap were confirmed using two measures.  First, IPA 
transcriptions from Webster’s New World College Dictionary of American English indicated 
identical initial phonemes.  Second, in a brief survey, at least 8 out of 10 American English 
speaking respondents agreed that the initial consonant-vowel or vowel-consonant sounds 
were the same across both words. 
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Semantic relatedness assessment. Surveys posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk were 
used to assess the semantic relatedness of the prime-target, prime-distractor, target-
distractor, and the subprime-target pairings for both the Related Prime and Unrelated 
Prime conditions. On each survey, respondents were asked to rate item pairs, presented as 
written words, on a scale from 1 to 7 (semantically unrelated to extremely semantically 
related). In addition to the test items, each survey included filler items that were either 
strongly related or completely unrelated to encourage participants to use both ends of the 
scale. Since the shared name affected participants similarity judgments, homophone prime-
target pairs were assessed in separate surveys using polysemes and other homophones as 
fillers. Each pair was rated by 10 respondents. We used an average rating of 5 as the 
criterion for a pair to be semantically related, with the exception of window-door which 
was rated slightly below this cut-off but was still included in the final stimulus set. We 
confirmed that semantic prime-target pairs and phono-semantic subprime-target pairs in 
the Related Prime condition were judged to be semantically related (M=6.18), and all other 
pairs were not (M=1.68, maximum=3.6). Further, apart from semantic pairs, primes and 
targets were comparably related in the Related Prime and Unrelated Prime conditions 
(t=0.08, p=0.940). 
Image selection. Colored line-drawings of familiar objects were selected from two 
sources: 140 from Rossion and Pourtois’s Snodgrass and Vanderwart 'Like' Objects (2004) 
and 112 from Google Image searches, with the latter edited to look stylistically similar to 
the former.  All images were cropped and resized to 267x200 pixels, so that the images 
covered approximately the same amount of space on the screen. Email surveys were used 
to ensure naming consistency for all images that were selected. At least 10 participants 
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named each image. Other than images with homophonous labels and images in the 
semantically-related trials, we used an inclusion criterion of 80% naming consistency. 
Different inclusion standards were used for homophone items due to people’s tendency to 
spontaneously produce adjectives when labeling these images e.g. fish tank rather than 
tank). For these items, prime images had to be named with at least 70% consistency, and 
target images were selected such that the intended word was usually part of the produced 
label (M=87%, minimum=64%). We relaxed the naming consistency requirements for the 
semantic primes and target to allow for near-synonyms, such as chicken and hen. For these 
items, that is the images with two common labels, both labels were tested for semantic 
relatedness in the procedure described in the earlier section. In general, for prime-target 
pairs with asymmetric naming consistency, the image that elicited more consistent labeling 
was used as the prime. Since we are probing implicit activation of the prime label, it is 
critical that this image elicits the intended label; if it does not, then the intended priming 
pattern will not occur even if implicit labeling does occur. Further, since participants heard 
the target label explicitly, for the target image, image recognition was more critical than the 
particular label that spontaneously came to mind.  
Procedure 
The experimental procedure, including stimulus presentation and eye tracking 
recording, was implemented using E-Prime software and the session was conducted using 
a Tobii T60 remote eye-tracker. At the beginning of the session, participants were told that 
they would be shown a series of images which they should try to remember because they 
would be tested on them later. 
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  Each trial began with fixation at center of the screen. After the participant fixated 
this location, the prime image appeared in the center of the screen and remained on-screen 
for 1500ms. This was followed by a blank screen for 200ms, and then the target and 
distractor images appeared on the two sides of the screen for 2500ms. Fifty milliseconds 
after these images appeared, the label for target image was played over the speakers. A 
sample trial progression is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic of a trial in related-prime phonological onset overlap condition (prime 
penny, and target pencil). In the unrelated-prime condition, the sequence remains the same 
except for the prime image, which would be replaced by bacon, with is the related-prime 
for a different target. 
 
 
The experiment was divided into three blocks of 28 trials, with 10 memory test 
trials at the end of each block. Each memory test trial consisted of a single image for which 
the participant gave an “old” or “new” judgment. The five old items were always exactly the 
same images as the ones presented earlier. The five new items were completely different 
items from ones that had been seen, rather than different instances of the same kinds (e.g. 
two different images corresponding to the label penny). 
After all of the experimental trials, each participant was given a post-test 
questionnaire to determine if they had noticed the various prime-target relationships 
present in the stimuli. They were asked 1) what they thought the experiment was about, 
Blank Screen 
No sound 
200ms 
Prime 
No sound 
1500ms 
Target-Distracter 
Target label at 50ms 
2500ms 
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and whether they noticed anything about 2) the pictures, 3) the words, 4) the relationship 
between the two pictures and the picture that preceded them on each trial. The questions 
became progressively more specific to give participants the greatest opportunity to 
indicate whether they noticed the prime-target relationships. We coded the responses in 
terms of whether or not participants noticed relationships between the image labels. All 
participants noticed the presence of homophones and 22 out of 32 were aware of other 
types of phonological relatedness as well. 
Following the post-test questionnaire, the participants were shown all 252 images 
individually on the screen and asked to name them. This allowed us to confirm that 
participants labeled the images with the expected nouns. 
Data processing 
Trackloss. Eye tracking data was recorded at 60Hz and each sample included a 
validity rating for the recording from each eye. Only samples that reported valid recording 
from both eyes were included in data analysis. Further, we excluded trials where fewer 
than 50% of the expected number of samples met this criterion; 4% of trials were excluded 
for this reason.  
Fixation coding. The duration of the target-distractor screen for each trial was 
divided into 25 hundred millisecond time-bins. For every 100ms, we coded whether there 
were any fixations in the 267x200 pixel region of the target image or the distractor image. 
Since we were interested in the amount of target looking relative to the distractor, time 
bins with no fixations in either region were excluded from further analysis. Thus, for each 
100ms bin where either the target or distractor was fixated, we analyzed whether the 
target was fixated. 
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Results and Discussion 
Memory accuracy and name agreement 
Participants were generally successful at recognizing old and new images during the 
memory components of the task (M=89%, SD=9%). Also, the naming post-test confirmed 
that the images used in the experiment generally elicited the expected labels for the primes 
(M=91%), targets (95%) and distracters (90%). Naming accuracy was likely higher for 
target images as participants heard labels for these images during the main experiment. 
Given the generally high rate of expected naming, we present analyses including all trials 
regardless of whether the image was correctly named in the post-test. 
Eye tracking results 
We did not have a priori hypotheses about the specific timing of each priming effect, 
so we used a data-driven technique for finding time windows with significant differences in 
target fixation probability in the Related Prime and Unrelated Prime conditions. A non-
parametric permutation test, adapted from (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007), was used to 
allow for flexibility while maintaining the probability of Type I error at p<0.05. For each 
100ms time bin, we performed a mixed-effects logistic regression with Prime Relatedness 
as a fixed effect, and with random intercepts for subjects and items; the different trial 
categories (homophone, phonological onset, phonosemantic, semantic) were analyzed 
separately. Next, we grouped adjacent time bins where there was a significant effect of 
relatedness into clusters. The z statistic of each time bin within a cluster was summed to 
yield a summary statistic for that cluster. A liberal criterion, p<0.25, was used for a time bin 
to be included in a cluster so that we could detect small but long-lasting priming effects. It 
is important to note, however, that the criterion for including a time bin in a cluster is 
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orthogonal to the process by which cluster significance is tested, so it does not affect the 
likelihood of a false positive. To determine the probability of observing a cluster of that size 
by chance, we conducted 1000 simulations where the condition labels (Related Prime or 
Unrelated Prime) for each trial were randomly assigned. The cluster-finding algorithm 
described above was then implemented on each set of reshuffled data. A time bin cluster 
was considered to show a significant effect of Prime Relatedness if its summed z statistic 
was greater than the summed z statistic of the largest cluster found in 95% of the re-
shuffled simulations. Thus, the total probability of a false positive is kept below .05. The p-
values reported here reflect the proportion of re-shuffled simulations that found clusters 
with summary statistics as large or larger than the reported cluster. 
Using this approach, we found a significant priming effect for the Homophone trials, 
but we did not observe significant priming for the Phonological-Onset, Phono-Semantic or 
Semantic trials (Figure 6). When the target was related to the prime via homophony, 
participants were more likely to fixate the target image, compared to unrelated control 
trials, from 900-2100ms following the target-distractor image onset (p<0.01). While we did 
not observe a significant time window for the effect of semantic-relatedness emerged later, 
we did detect two adjacent clusters of time bins with significant differences, with fewer 
looks to the target image following a related prime, from 1500-1900ms window and 2000-
2500ms (p=0.31 and p=0.12, respectively). Thus, there was a marginal effect of semantic 
priming, since the result would have reached significance if the single time bin from 1900-
2000ms (p=0.29) had shown a larger effect; if the p-value for this time bin had been less 
than .25 then the two clusters mentioned above would have been combined into a single, 
more robust cluster.  
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Figure 6. Experiment 1 eye tracking results. Proportion of looks to target image for a) 
Phonological-Onset, b) Homophone, c) Semantic, and d) Phono-semantic relatedness trial 
types.  
 
 
These results parallel the findings from visual search tasks (Meyer, et al., 2007; 
Telling, 2008), in which homophony between the target image and one of the distractors 
affects eye movement patterns, but partial phonological overlap does not. On the other 
hand, the absence of phonological-onset and phono-semantic effects in the current 
experiment stands in contrast to the results from 18 and 24 month olds in a similar task 
(Mani & Plunkett, 2010; 2011; Mani et al, 2012). Overall, the similarity of the present 
findings to those from other adult implicit labeling paradigms suggests that adults do not 
spontaneously activate phonological representations during visual object processing. Since 
the current experiment uses a paradigm that parallels the infant studies, it seems that 
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differences in testing procedure cannot account for why phonological-onset and phono-
semantic priming is observed in infant implicit naming studies, but are absent in studies 
with adults; a developmental explanation is needed. 
The divergence of the Homophone and Phonological-Onset conditions, which is also 
observed in the visual search paradigm, is open to several interpretations. One possibility 
is that homophony and phonological overlap effects are on the same continuum, but only 
the homophone effects are detectable because total overlap leads to greater priming. 
Another possibility is that there is a qualitative difference between  the homophones and 
phonological-onset pairs that affects priming in this task. In particular, differences could 
arise if participants do not activate phonological representations of the image labels (i.e. 
phonemes), but do activate word-form representations (i.e. lexemes). For example, an 
image of a baseball bat could prime bat-animal by activating the word-form bat, but it could 
only prime bag by activating the phonemes that the two words have in common. 
We further examined the Phonological-Onset trials to determine whether the results 
suggest that a smaller version of the Homophone priming effect might be present. While 
there were no time windows with significant priming effects for the Phonological-Onset 
condition, there were some interesting trends. First, the two largest non-significant 
clusters, 1100-1500ms (p=0.31) and 1900-2100ms (p=0.68) overlapped with the time 
window indicated in the Homophone analysis, and in both cases, there were more looks to 
the target in the Related Prime condition. Second, we estimated our power to detect an 
effect of phonological priming, assuming that it would occur in the same time window as 
the homophone priming effect and would be approximately half the size. Our observed 
power for a t-test, by subjects, in this window was 0.7 (Lenth, 2006-9). Third, we compared 
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average proportion of target looking in the 900-2100ms window in related and unrelated 
trials for the Homophone and Phonological-Onset conditions, using a mixed-effects 
regression, with the maximally appropriate random-effects structure that converged, for 
subjects and items, and only found a marginally significant interaction (β=0.07, SE=0.04, 
p=0.06). Together, these features of the data cast some doubt on the absence of 
phonological-onset priming in this experiment. Experiment 2 focuses on phonological-
onset priming and addresses these concerns. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we explored whether this paradigm is in fact sensitive to 
phonological onset priming in adults. To this end, we changed the design from Experiment 
1 in two ways. First, we doubled the number of phonological onset trials so that we would 
have greater statistical power to detect any small effects that are present. Second, we 
included another condition, between-subjects, where the prime is auditorily labeled. This 
allowed us to determine whether we could detect phonological priming effects in this 
paradigm, with these items, when we ensure that the prime label was activated. Observing  
priming effects in this condition indicates that our paradigm is sensitive to phonological 
activation when labels are explicitly presented and suggests that the lack of priming in the 
other condition is due to an absence of phonological activation  when objects are viewed in 
silence. 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-four native English speakers between 18 and 28 years old (41 female, mean 
age 21 years) were recruited from the Harvard University subject pool. An additional eight 
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participants completed the experiment but were not included due to excessive eye-tracking 
data loss (more than 50% unusable trials in at least one condition). Participants either 
received partial course-credit or $10 as compensation. 
Materials 
There were 108 trials in this experiment: 48 phonological onset trials (Related 
Prime or Unrelated Prime) and 60 filler trials. The prime-target-distractor triplets from 
Experiment 1 were mostly used again in Experiment 2, with a few changes. In addition, the 
phono-semantic triplets were converted to phonological onset triplets by replacing the 
target image with the subprime. For example, the phono-semantic prime-target pair log-key 
from Experiment 1 was converted to log-lock in Experiment 2. These new target images 
were normed for naming consistency and semantic-relatedness using the same procedures 
and criteria as Experiment 1. Additionally, we wanted to increase the number of trials with 
no phonological relatedness to counteract the increased number of phonological onset 
triplets (24 in Experiment 1, 48 in Experiment 2). These filler trials came from three 
sources. Twenty-four new filler trials were added to the design, with primes, targets and 
distracters all unrelated to each other. Further, all 12 homophone trials were presented in 
the Unrelated Prime condition and treated as fillers. Finally, like in Experiment 1, there 
were 24 semantic trials, with half presented in the Related Prime condition and half 
presented in the Unrelated Prime condition. The Related semantic trials were included 
because participants were typically aware of semantic relatedness and we hoped that this 
would prevent them from realizing that phonological relatedness was of particular interest 
in the study. 
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As in Experiment 1, eight experimental lists were created such that Prime 
Relatedness, target side and block order for each phonological onset item was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each block in Experiment 2 consisted of 36 trials. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Prime-Labeled or Prime-Unlabeled 
condition. The Prime-Unlabeled condition was identical to Experiment 1 except for the 
differences in stimuli detailed above.  In the Prime-Labeled condition, the procedure was 
modified by adding a recording of the label for the prime image that began when the prime 
image appeared on the screen. Thus, in the Prime-Labeled condition both the target and the 
prime were explicitly labeled, obviating the need for implicit labeling. In contrast, in the 
Prime-Unlabeled condition, like Experiment 1, only the target was auditorily labeled, so 
phonological priming effects would depend on implicitly labeling the prime image. 
As before, participants completed a post-test questionnaire to assess whether they 
noticed the presence of phonologically related items. Out of 64 participants, 44 mentioned 
phonological relatedness in their answers, and this did not differ based on whether they 
were in the Prime-Labeled or Prime-Unlabeled condition. Finally, participants were shown 
all of the images from the experiment individually and were asked to name them so that we 
could confirm naming consistency for the critical items. 
Data Processing 
Eye tracking data was processed in the same manner as Experiment 1. 7% of trials 
were excluded from data analysis due to excessive trackloss, based on the criteria outlined 
earlier. 
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Results and Discussion 
Memory accuracy and name agreement 
Average accuracy on the memory trials in the Prime-Unlabeled condition was 85% 
(SD=10%), compared to 80% (SD=9%) in the Prime-Labeled condition (t(62)=2.06, 
p<0.05). We assessed naming accuracy for the critical trial images across these two 
conditions from the picture naming posttest. Overall, participants generally named pictures 
as expected in both the Prime-Unlabeled and Prime-Labeled conditions (across items, 
M=94% and 95%, respectively). As expected, participants in the Prime-Labeled condition 
correctly named the prime images at a higher rate than those in the Prime-Unlabeled, since 
they had heard labels for these images in the main experiment (across items, 95% vs. 91%, 
t(47)=3.80, p<0.01). 
Eye tracking results 
 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 2 eye tracking results. Proportion of looks to target image following a 
Phonological-Onset prime image that was a) Unlabeled or b) Labeled. 
 
We analyzed the eye tracking data separately for the Prime-Labeled and Prime-
Unlabeled condition, using the cluster-finding procedure to find time regions with 
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significant priming effects (Figure 7). In the Prime-Unlabeled condition, there were no 
reliable differences between proportion of target fixations when the target and prime were 
phonologically related or unrelated (p>0.3 for the largest observed cluster). On the other 
hand, in the Prime-Labeled condition, there was a long-lasting phonological priming effect 
(p<0.01), emerging at 1100ms and continuing until 2500ms, the end of the trial. During this 
time, participants were less likely to look at the target image if it was phonologically 
related to the preceding prime image; this effect is in the opposite direction from the 
homophone effect in Experiment 1. We compared the average proportion of target fixations 
in this time window across the Prime-Labeled and Prime-Unlabeled conditions using a 
linear mixed-effects regression, with random intercepts for subjects and items. There was a 
significant interaction between labeling and relatedness (β=0.07, SE=0.02, p<0.01), further 
supporting the conclusion that phonological priming was only present when the prime was 
explicitly labeled. 
The results from the Prime-Unlabeled condition strengthen the null effect of 
phonological priming from Experiment 1. In both experiments, simply viewing an image 
did not lead to phonological priming from the label of that image. This cannot simply be a 
failure of the priming paradigm used here, as the presence of phonological priming in the 
Prime-Labeled condition indicates that this paradigm is sensitive to phonological 
activation. This suggests that adults, unlike infants, do not spontaneously activate the 
phonological representation of the image label in noncommunicative contexts. We cannot 
fully rule out the possibility that implicit phonological priming does occur but was too 
weak to be detected in our task. However, we did not find an increase in the cluster size or 
reliability after doubling the number of items with phonological-onset overlap from 
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Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, as we might have expected if there was a real but weak 
effect. In addition, we conducted a power analysis, parallel to the one in Experiment 1, to 
estimate our power to detect an effect of phonological priming in Experiment 2. We 
assumed that the effect would occur in the same time window as the homophone priming 
effect in Experiment 1 and would be approximately half the size. Our observed power for a 
t-test, by subjects, in this window was 0.8 (Lenth, 2006-9). 
General Discussion 
 The experiments presented here demonstrated that viewing an image, without 
hearing or speaking its label, affects subsequent looking time to images that are related via 
homophony but not images that are related via partial phonological label overlap. This data 
pattern simultaneously suggests both the presence and absence of implicit linguistic 
activation during visual object processing, perhaps reflecting different levels of 
representation. The null effect of partial phonological overlap and the positive finding for 
homophone priming echo the results of the visual search tasks that have investigated 
implicit label activation (Meyer, et al, 2007; Telling, 2008; Zelinsky, & Murphy, 2000). On 
the other hand, the absence of phono-semantic and phonological overlap effects in the 
current study contrasts with the infant studies that have found such effects.  
 Given the results of these experiments, combined with the prior implicit labeling 
results with both adults and infants, our account of verbal activation during image 
recognition needs to address two puzzles in the data pattern: 1) Why do we find 
homophone priming but not phonological priming in adult implicit labeling experiments? 
2) Why do infants, but not adults, show phonological priming in this paradigm? Below we 
consider three hypotheses. 
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One possibility is that adults do not engage in implicit labeling unless it is strategic 
for the task at hand (Zelinsky, & Murphy, 2000). Under this hypothesis, the absence of 
phonological effects in the current study and in the visual search paradigms is due to the 
lack of a working memory component in these tasks. The contrast with infants can be 
accounted for by suggesting that at the early stages of language acquisition, language 
activation might not be specialized or strategic. Alternatively, it is conceivable that image 
viewing might be a context where activating words is functional for an infant, who is 
engaged in word learning every day. It is more difficult under this story to explain the 
homophone effects, since the presence of homophone priming suggests that adults are also 
activating words in these tasks that lack a strategic verbal component.  
Another possibility is that the phenomena are qualitatively similar but 
quantitatively distinct: spontaneous implicit labeling occurs in both adults and children 
and phonological representations are activated in both groups. However, in adults 
phonological priming is too weak to detect when only a few phonemes are shared. In 
adults, complete phonological overlap increases the strength of priming so that is 
detectable for homophones. Phonological priming is detectable in infants because the size 
of the lexicon is much smaller in infants, estimated at about 300 words for a typical 24-
month-old (Dale & Fenson, 1996), compared to 60,000 for a typical adult (e.g., Miller, 1996; 
Nagy & Herman, 1987; Pinker, 1994). Thus, the fan size (Anderson, 1974) is simply much 
smaller for priming in the infant’s lexical network. Consequently, the activation of one or 
two phonemes spreads to only a handful of known words resulting in detectable priming of 
the target. 
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There are some observations, however, that argue against the idea that phonological 
priming did occur in the current experiments but was too weak to be detected. For one, we 
did not observe phonological onset priming even after doubling the number of items in 
Experiment 2 in an effort to increase the sensitivity of the paradigm to such effects. Nor did 
we find any increase in the reliability of the non-significant phonological priming effects 
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. In addition, the phonological priming effect in 
the Prime-Labeled condition in Experiment 2 suggests that the current paradigm was 
sensitive to phonological activation. The repeated failure to find phonological overlap 
effects or word length in visual search tasks (Telling, 2008; Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000) also 
speaks against the idea that implicit activation occurs during visual object processing in 
adults. 
 Finally, we consider the possibility that adults spontaneously recruit verbal labels 
during visual tasks but not at a phonological level of representation. For example, visual 
object processing might result in activating a lexical item without activating all of the 
component phonemes of that word. Under this hypothesis, homophone priming effects 
occur in implicit verbalization studies because homophones share word-level 
representations (lexemes, e.g., Levelt, et al., 1999; but see Caramazza, Bi, Costa, & Miozzo, 
2004). Phonological onset pairs, on the other hand, only share phonological level 
representations. Therefore, if visual processing spontaneously leads to lexical but not 
phonological activation, phonological priming does not occur in these tasks. 
Under the hypothesis above, a strategic or task-dependent aspect to implicit 
language use is still necessary for explaining why different levels of verbal activation might 
occur across tasks and age groups. For example, phonological representations are recruited 
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to support working memory in visual tasks, as demonstrated by the word length effect 
during image encoding in Zelinsky and Murphy’s (2000) recognition memory task. 
Experience or proficiency with the task at hand might also play a role in the form of implicit 
language use. Research in the domain of private speech (overt verbalization that is self-
directed) has found that, while this phenomenon primarily occurs in young children, adults 
also engage in private speech when engaged in difficult or unfamiliar tasks (Sanchez 
Medina, Rubio, & De la Mata Benitez, 2009). In fact, contrary to the traditional Vygotskian 
model (Vygotsky, 1934/1987), these authors suggest that the transition from overt private 
speech to inner speech is a function of task-specific factors, such as proficiency and 
experience, rather than age or developmental stage. This explanation can be extended, 
then, to include a continuum of levels of representation, rather than just the binary 
distinction of inner speech versus private speech. There are many different levels of 
representation for a single word, from central conceptual representations to peripheral 
sub-articulatory representations. Lexemes and phonemes are just two of the levels of 
representation on this continuum. The proposal here is that 1) inner speech may vary in 
terms of which of these levels of representation it recruits, and 2) the form of inner speech 
depends of task proficiency, with more specified representations being recruited in less 
familiar or more difficult tasks. 
The investigation of when visual object recognition leads to the activation of verbal 
representations forms one part of understanding when and how and why language enters 
internal thought. The homophone priming effect in Experiment 1 suggests that, in visual 
tasks, adults spontaneously activate some verbal representations of the image labels. 
However, this activation does not result in phonological priming. These results parallel 
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previous studies on spontaneous label activation in adults: visual search tasks which find 
homophone priming but not phonological priming (Meyer, et al., 2007; Telling, 2008; 
Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). This consistent pattern suggests that word-level 
representations and phonological representations might be dissociable in implicit verbal 
label activation in adults, and that only the former are spontaneously activated during 
visual object processing.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 The three studies in this dissertation have painted a heterogeneous picture of inner 
speech, as seen through the lens of implicit verbal labeling. Paradoxically, the results seem 
to simultaneously point to inner speech becoming more and becoming less prevalent 
through development. In this chapter, I discuss the results from these studies with respect 
to each other to try to unravel this contradiction. Through considering the task contexts in 
which verbal activation is observed in different age groups, a more nuanced view emerges 
of inner speech and its role in cognition. 
To begin, the results and implications of each study are summarized here. In 
Chapter 2, we saw that adults and school-aged children spontaneously use a verbal 
encoding strategy when asked to remember images in a short-term memory task, whereas 
preschoolers relied solely on visual encoding. One interpretation of these results is that 
implicit verbal activation is automatic but late emerging, since it was observed in older 
children and adults but not in younger children. Alternatively, the data are also consistent 
with a picture of implicit verbal activation where it is task-related in a way that interacts 
with age, since the older age groups might understand the task of memory encoding 
differently than the 4-year-olds. 
In Chapter 3, we saw that 24-month-old infants who are viewing images in a non-
communicative context spontaneously implicitly activate verbal labels. We observed 
phono-semantic priming stemming from an image that was presented silently, indicating 
that the infants activated the phonological form of the word. This phonological activation 
spread through the lexical network, through semantic connections, as activation from an 
explicitly spoken word would. The infants’ task in this study was simply to look at the 
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images and yet we found evidence of phonological label activation, suggesting that this 
process is spontaneous, rather than task-driven, in 24-month-olds. 
The adult state for implicit verbal activation was explored in Chapter 4. Across two 
experiments, there was no evidence for phonological activation of verbal labels during 
picture viewing. This null effect contrasts the results from 24-month-olds in a picture 
viewing task, and is also unlike the results from adults in a short term memory task. 
However, the data pattern is not consistent with a complete lack of verbal activation, either, 
since we observed homophone priming stemming from an image that was presented 
silently. Since homophone image pairs are only related by virtue of their labels, such 
priming effects indicate that some level of lexical activation occurred. These results suggest  
that perhaps adults were recruiting abstract lexical representations, such as word-forms, 
without activating the corresponding phonological representations. 
 How do we reconcile the apparent increase in implicit language use through 
development observed in Chapter 2, with the apparent decrease that is seen in Chapters 3 
and 4? Even with the studies with adults, there appears to be inconsistency, with robust 
phonological activation present in the experiment in Chapter 2 but absent in the 
experiments in Chapter 4. The story of implicit verbal activation – of inner speech – that 
emerges must consider both task and age,  as well as their interactions. Although there are 
surely many other options that are compatible with the data at hand, the following 
paragraphs focus on just two of the possible developmental trajectories. 
 One possibility is that implicit verbal activation occurs automatically in infants and 
gradually becomes more task-constrained through development, such that verbal 
activation is limited to contexts where it is functional in adulthood. On this story, the 
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phonological form of “apple” might enter an infant’s mind any time he or she recognizes an 
apple in the environment, whereas adults will strategically recruit representations based 
on the task at hand. In a working memory task, for example, it might be useful to encode 
phonological distinctiveness and so the form “apple” would be activated. Other tasks might 
benefit more from, for instance, visual or conceptual distinctiveness, and so different 
representations would be recruited and relied on depending on the particular task context. 
For example, Konkle and colleagues found that conceptual distinctiveness was a key factor 
in performance on a visual long term memory test, but perceptual factors were more 
important when the same stimuli were used in a visual search context (Konkle, Brady, 
Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010). 
The account outlined above maps neatly onto the findings in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation: 24-month-olds spontaneously activate phonological representations in a free-
viewing task, whereas adults in a very similar task do not. It also explains the discrepancy 
between the absence of phonological activation in Chapter 4 and the results of Chapter 2, 
where adults in a working memory task do activate phonological labels. In both cases, 
adults were arguably selectively recruiting the representations best suited for the task at 
hand. Decreasing automatic verbal encoding and the rise of strategic verbal encoding 
through development is consistent with the absence of implicit verbal activation in 4-year-
olds in Chapter 2’s working memory study. On this story, phonological activation is no 
longer automatic in preschoolers and they have not yet acquired the metacognitive 
knowledge to realize when verbal encoding would be strategic to invoke. While this 
developmental account does explain the current data pattern, it also has unsatisfying 
aspects. Why is phonological activation automatic in infants? Does it serve a particular 
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cognitive function at this age? In addition, there are questions about the end of automatic 
implicit verbalization. Do adults inhibit verbal activation (e.g. would phonological 
activation be observed under cognitive load conditions?) or is there a developmental 
discontinuity such that this activation no longer occurs? 
Another hypothesis is that, at all developmental stages, self-directed speech can 
occur at different levels of linguistic representation, from abstract implicit linguistic 
representations to overt private speech. The level at which activation occurs depends on 
the task at hand, the individual’s familiarity with that task, and meta-cognitive factors. Of 
course, the latter two factors are both likely to correlate with age. The interaction of age 
and task in terms of verbal activation can be seen across the studies in this dissertation. For 
example, comparing the results from Chapter 4 to infant studies (e.g. in Chapter 3, and see 
also Mani et al., 2012; Mani & Plunkett, 2010; 2011), it seems that verbal activation during 
picture viewing occurs at a higher or more central level in adults than in infants. Although 
the results in Chapter 4 are open to a few different interpretations, one possible conclusion 
is that adults were activating lexeme-level representations while processing the visual 
images, whereas infants in a similar experimental paradigm were activating phoneme-level 
representations. 
It is reasonable to imagine that the level of verbal representation that is functional 
to encode in a task changes with age. Phonological activation during picture viewing might 
be a useful activity for a 2-year-old who is less familiar with both the words and the 
concepts at hand. The notion that implicit verbal activation during picture viewing 
becomes less concrete (or less phonological) with age is indirectly supported by a study on 
overregularization by Ramscar, Dye and McCauley (in press). In this study, priming 
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younger children with images of sets of items, which corresponded to regular plurals, 
increased overregularization rates when children subsequently described images that 
should have evoked irregular plurals. On the other hand, the same primes decreased 
overregularization rates in older children. While the authors interpret these results in light 
of accumulating evidence about plural forms through language learning, this pattern is also 
consistent with an explanation where the younger children were more likely to activate the 
phonological form of the labels of the plural sets, and therefore the phonological form of 
the regular plural morpheme was more likely to interfere at the time of test. Of course, 
there are other possible mechanisms that could lead to the result, including changes in the 
underlying representations in the plural forms of various nouns, but it is interesting to 
consider the role implicit verbal activation might have been playing in this paradigm. 
The idea here is not that implicit verbal representations are necessarily more 
concrete (e.g. at a phonological versus lexical level of representation) in younger 
populations, but that the level of representation depends on how the individual interacts 
with the task at hand. One specific suggestion is that more concrete representations are 
more useful when individuals are less familiar with the cognitive task at hand. The thought 
that implicit verbal representations become less concrete with increases in task proficiency 
and experience, which is of course related to age, echoes an idea put forward with respect 
to overt private speech. While the Vygotskian tradition tends to view the internalization of 
private speech as a developmental stage, there are reasons to believe that the shift is task-
dependent. In particular, there is evidence that adults performing difficult or unfamiliar 
tasks sometimes revert to audible private speech, rather than strictly using silent inner 
speech (Sanchez Medina, Rubio, & De la Mata Benitez, 2009). Perhaps, rather than simply 
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observing a dichotomy between private speech and inner speech, it is more appropriate to 
think of a continuum of levels of representation of “inner” speech. On this continuum, the 
most concrete end of the scale would correspond to overt private speech, and the most 
abstract end would be approaching nonverbal conceptual representations. 
Turning to larger issues, a more complete understanding implicit verbal activation 
has implications for many areas of cognitive psychology. A few examples are given here. 
First, accurate theories of the function of inner speech are important for understanding the 
consequences of atypical inner speech, such as in some subtypes of schizophrenia. There is 
also some evidence that children with autism spectrum disorders use inner speech 
differently (Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006). Second, studies on the nature and 
deployment of inner speech are critical to the interpretation of linguistic relativity effects. 
To the extent that a cognitive task leads to spontaneous verbal activation, then we should 
not be surprised to see differences in performance across language groups, since the task 
evoked differing linguistic representations. Third, this research has implications for the 
study of language processing. Many studies within psycholinguistics use the Visual World 
Paradigm (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995), where participants 
listen to spoken utterances which correspond to a visual display, while their eye 
movements are recorded. If participants are likely to encode the visual stimuli at some 
level of verbal representation, independently of the auditory stimuli, this must be taken 
into account in interpreting their eye movement patterns. If we neglect the possibility of 
linguistic activation stemming from the visual input, we might draw false conclusions about 
the efficiency and speed of processing of the auditory input. Moreover, the study of implicit 
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verbal labeling, and of inner speech more generally, might also be valuable in informing 
theories of how the non-linguistic context interacts with language processing. 
In sum, the studies presented in this dissertation demonstrate that inner speech is 
present in infants as young as 24-months-old, that implicit linguistic representations 
depend on the task at hand, and that this task-dependence interacts with age. Taken 
together, these studies also illustrate how eye-tracking can be used as a window into 
internal verbal representations in paradigms that are appropriate for a wide range of 
populations. Still, there are many unanswered questions for future research to address. Of 
particular interest is investigation of the function of internal verbal representations. When 
and why is it useful to recruit language for non-communicative cognitive tasks? And if it is 
not useful, then why does it occur? And, in either case, what are the mechanisms that result 
in inner speech? A full answer to these questions will allow us to better understand the 
patterns of implicit verbal activation observed in these studies and others, to explain when 
we should expect to see inner speech across different contexts, and to predict what form 
inner speech will take. 
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Appendix A 
Item Word 
Length 
Frequency (per 
million words) 
Categorization 
Speed 
Visual Complexity 
Rating 
arm short 120 690.2 2.1 
bell short 46 616.4 2.6 
bread short 207 584.6666667 1.9 
bus short 292 608.2 4.7 
corn short 100 553.7777778 3.8 
ear short 152 595 3.1 
fork short 89 539.6 1.7 
key short 43 638.7777778 2.3 
kite short 43 597.5555556 2.7 
skunk short 14 654.7 4.6 
alligator long 42 623.2222222 3.9 
banana long 51 478.1111111 1.3 
butterfly long 142 539.7 4.6 
dinosaur long 216 475.8888889 5.1 
gorilla long 5 615.1 3.5 
helicopter long 15 581.7 5 
potato long 54 554.8 1.3 
strawberry long 53 554.5555556 2.5 
umbrella long 62 498.3333333 3.7 
watermelon long 62 612.8 2.3 
 
List of items for recognition memory experiment conducted with 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds and 
adults (Chapter 2). Frequencies extracted from CHILDES transcripts with 4-year-olds, average 
categorization speed from the norming task and visual complexity ratings (1=very simple, 
7=quite complex) from the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey are also included. 
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Appendix B 
Target Distractor Related Prime 
(SR, VS) 
Related Subprime 
(SR) 
Unrelated Prime 
(SR, VS) 
apple pen ball (1.9, 2.6) banana (5.8) cup (1.3, 1.1) 
bread phone key (1.0, 1.2) cake (5.9) sheep (1.2, 2.1) 
bus tree carrot (1.3, 1.7) car (5.9) duck (1.1, 1.7) 
coat foot house (2.4, 1.1) hat (5.2) ball (1.1, 1.4) 
cow flower hand (1.2, 1.4) horse (5.6) book (1.0, 1.6) 
dog box cup (1.5, 1.2) cat (5.7) house (2.8, 2.0) 
sock plane sheep (1.8, 2.1) shoe (5.8) key (1.0, 1.1) 
table brush cheese (1.8, 1.2) chair (5.7) carrot (1.5, 1.1) 
train spoon book (1.5, 1.2) boat (5.4) hand (1.2, 1.0) 
window bib duck (1.0, 1.4) door (5.1) cheese (1.1, 1.2) 
 
List of items for spontaneous implicit labeling experiment with 24-month-olds (Chapter 3). SR 
indicates the average rating for semantic relatedness to the target and VS indicates the 
average rating for visual similarity to the target. 
 
 
